Why John Bolton Threatened the ICC

Michael Barbaro: Here's what else you need to know today, the Trump administration is furious that the International Court, which the US helped create but never formally joined, is considering an investigation into US military action in Afghanistan that could result in the prosecution of American soldiers.

John Bolton: We will let the ICC die on its own. After all, for all intents and purposes, the ICC is already dead to us.

Michael Barbaro: In a statement, one of the Court's founders, David Scheffer, said that Bolton's speech "isolates the United States from international Criminal justice and severely undermines our leadership in bringing perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice elsewhere in the world".

Michael Barbaro: That's it for the Daily. I'm Michael Barbaro. See you tomorrow.

Brian Hanson: This is Deep Dish on Global Affairs, going beyond the headlines on critical global issues. I'm Brian Hanson and today I'm with Ambassador David Scheffer, who you've just heard quoted in The Daily podcast from The New York Times, to take a look at the International Criminal Court and particularly, the relationship between the Court and the United States. Ambassador Scheffer led the US negotiating team during the United Nation's talks on the International Criminal Court and actually signed the treaty, establishing the ICC on behalf of the United States. David is also a nonresident senior fellow here at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and he has a new book coming out in November, The Sit Room: In the Theater of War and Peace, which will be out November first. David, it's great to have you here.

David Scheffer: Thanks. Great pleasure.

Brian Hanson: We know that the International Criminal Court made headlines this week, or at least John Bolton made headlines talking about the International Criminal Court, threatening with sanctions, specifically what he was reacting to was that the Court is considering an investigation into US military action in Afghanistan after 9/11. He dramatically said in his speech, we are going to not cooperate but we will let the ICC die on its own, after all, for all intents and purposes, the ICC is already dead to us.

Brian Hanson: Now, I want to talk about this current set of politics, but before we go there I briefly want to go back to why we even have the ICC. You were negotiating this in the 1990s and the one thing I remember very vividly about the 1990s is the wave of genocides and mass atrocities, from Rwanda, 800,000 people killed in 100 days, Darfur in Sudan, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, violence, mass atrocities in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and on and on. In this context came this discussion about creating an International Criminal Court, what's the relationship? Why was that seen as a good response to this side of atrocities that we were seeing?

David Scheffer: The prospect of a permanent International Criminal Court gained currency quite quickly in the early 1990s as we were building the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to deal with the Bosnian conflict and the Rwandan tribunal, the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda to deal with the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and of course, the Bosnian conflict was from 1991 through to the end of 1995. Those conflicts elicited an enormous amount of demand for accountability, and the Security Council stepped up to that challenge to create those two tribunals with strong US support. The problem is that the Security Council has limited bandwidth for constantly doing this. It's a costly exercise as each set of atrocities occur. So the proposal for a permanent International Criminal Court actually made a lot of sense, it was a cost-effective way of creating a system of accountability, globally, that would avoid the startup costs that you always have with individual tribunals that deal with specific situations.

David Scheffer: So, that was the impetus behind it. We, fortunately, had at that very moment, in the International Law Commission, discussion about this prospect in 1992 and 1993, and so that draft from the International Law Commission that the UN became our template and allowed us to then move forward in government to government negotiations with the UN, which concluded in July of 1998. But the logic was very clear and quite frankly, quite American, cost-efficient international justice with the consent of treaty party states.

David Scheffer: It must be emphasized that the Clinton administration supported the creation of the International Criminal Court. President Clinton was on record six times publicly supporting it and, of course, my instructions as the lead negotiator were, build this court and we will come. So it wasn't as if the United States had an anti-ICC attitudes, it was very pro-ICC. The issue at the end of the day, however, was what precisely is the character of this court? What precisely is its jurisdiction? How does it precisely work? That's where there were complications in the final product in Rome that prohibited us from actually supporting that draft at that time. But then of course two years later we signed the Rome statute. I was the one who signed it at President Clinton's direction at the end of 2000. Why? Because during those two years we had worked a lot of our problems out with respect to the Rome statute.

Brian Hanson: This is great, it leads into a question that a listener, a Deep Dish listener, asked on our Facebook group, which is what laws does the ICC enforce and what is its jurisdiction? How did that end up?

David Scheffer: Okay, first question, laws. We spent years in the negotiations, determining what is called in the law the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, the law to be enforced. What you see in articles five, six, seven and eight of the Rome statute is, to a very large extent, an American product because we deeply involved ourselves. This is what's so misleading in Mr. Bolton's speech, he says, what are these crimes, we can't define them. Well, I'm sorry we spent years defining them and the Pentagon signed off on it all because it is exactly where we wanted these particular terms to be defined and how we define them, that the law is what we call international humanitarian law as well as the law of war. Two slightly distinctive fields of law, but they are there, and that means the law pertaining to the crime of genocide, the law pertaining to crimes against humanity, which are assaults, systematic, widespread assaults on civilian populations and then, war crimes, which of course we draw from the Geneva Conventions and from customary international law. And then most recently, the crime of aggression, which again, Mr. Bolton got wrong in his speech. I mean, I'm just starting to point out to you there are so many accuracies in his speech I have to wonder who on the NSC staff is reading these things and fact-checking them but nonetheless, those were the definitional parameters and they very much are well-established in international law.

Brian Hanson: What is the jurisdiction? The US signed it, as you point out, we didn't ratify it, and we'll talk a little bit about why we didn't, but before we get there, this is ... There are, I believe, 123 countries that have ratified this, is the jurisdiction limited only to those countries, people from those countries? How was that result?

David Scheffer: Yes and no. It depends on the circumstances. On the face of it, those 123 countries, which by the way include all of Europe, all of it, all of Latin America, and then all of North America except for the United States, a good part of Africa, and a smaller part of Asia in terms of numbers in countries, so that comprises your 123. They are all covered by obligations under the statute, they have to pay assessments, they're a part of the Court's structure. Any crime that takes place on the territory of those countries is subject to the jurisdiction of the court and any crime committed by any national of those countries, national of those countries, is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, even if that national commits the crime on nonparty territory. So that's how the jurisdiction is structured.

David Scheffer: Now, beyond those 123, it is possible to get a nonstate party national into the Court and into its jurisdiction and to have an entire country, a nonparty country, subject to the jurisdiction of the court if the Security Council passes an enforcement resolution referring that country's situation of atrocities to the ICC, and that has happened twice with respect to Darfur in the mid-2000s, 2005 I believe, and then again, Libia in 2011. So those two countries are not member states, but they're totally subject to the jurisdiction of the Court for the atrocities that issue because the Security Council so directed. And with the United States abstaining on the Darfur vote, which allowed it to go forward, and voting very much for it on the Libia vote.

Brian Hanson: Great. You signed this treaty and then George Bush very famously declared, when he came into power after the Clinton administration, George W. Bush, that he was un-signing the treaty on behalf of the United States, and this starts the conversation about the Bolton piece because the concern about how US troops are going to be treated under this was something that every administration has been concerned about, you've been concerned about, you touched on it already a little bit here. The New Yorker points out that at one point you testified before Congress about whether or not we should sign the statute, arguing that it's unacceptable for US forces to be subject to prosecution under the statute that we didn't ratify, you talk about it being contrary to the most fundamental principles of treaty law, it could inhibit the ability of the US to use its military to meet alliance obligations and participate in military operations, boy, David, that sounds a lot like John Bolton. So help me understand what was the point you were making at that point and how is it similar or different than the argument John Bolton is making?

David Scheffer: Well, remember that it was a treaty that was in process in the 1990s. I was putting forward the US position during the negotiations, and even after the Rome statute was finalized in July of 1998 there was a two-year period where we were preparing the elements of crimes and the rules of procedure and evidence of the Court where we also had the opportunity to put our position forward and get some adjustments in those documents to accommodate our concerns. So the official US position, which I always articulated in the 1990s, is this argument that frankly, is very similar to John Bolton's argument, it's just that I was presenting it in kind of a methodology of let's work this out so that we get to a satisfactory platform of acceptance of this Court. Whereas, the way he approaches it is I'm going to use the same argument in order to destroy the Court. So it's a very different negotiating strategy.

David Scheffer: I'll just briefly say that the theory certainly has its merit to it, which is that if you are a government that is entering into a treaty, of course, you're bound to that treaty. This was creating a regime of criminal jurisdiction in the world whereby governments who joined the Rome statute are essentially delegating that criminal jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court, as opposed to prosecuting on their own territory, in their own courts. US soldiers are subject to national courts around the world for what they do nationally unless there's a status of forces agreement that arranges criminal procedures between that government and the United States. That's standard. We do it all the time. That's how we got soldiers deployed around the world. So we handle the criminal side of that through those status of forces agreements. This was a proposal not really to do that, but rather there would be a delegation of that criminal jurisdiction to an international criminal court, which we had not signed up to.

David Scheffer: So it's a different legal paradigm from the normal conventional way of looking at international criminal law, and that's why we put that position forward but it was really to put forward in order to have a space of non-exposure to the Court before we actually joined the Court. It wasn't an argument to never join the Court or to say the Court is illegitimate. It was an argument to say that until the United States joins the Court, we believe that we have this space as a nonparty state whereby you cannot go after our soldiers.

David Scheffer: Now, of course when we join the Court that changes dramatically, and that was the gist of that argument was to keep us clear of the Court until we actually join it. And also, by doing so, allow us to be supportive of the Court overall with our diplomatic and other resources. That was the strategy in the Clinton administration.

Brian Hanson: I'm here with Ambassador David Scheffer who helped establish the International Criminal Court under the Clinton administration. David, one of the things that is interesting, particularly following the discussion that we've just had, and you've just talked about creating space for the US to protect its troops and all before we join the Court. Now, we haven't joined the Court and yet we have this decision before the Court of whether or not to investigate exactly this, US troop, [inaudible 00:15:06] leaders for actions that they took in Afghanistan after 9/11 on the battlefield. Why is that even possible?

David Scheffer: Because Afghanistan is a state party to the ICC, to the International Criminal Court. This examination by the prosecutor of the ICC also involves Poland, Lithuania and Romania were so-called black sights of the CIA existed and where these Afghan detainees were allegedly taken and these crimes allegedly committed against them at the black sites. So it actually involves four countries, all of which are member states of the ICC.

David Scheffer: We fought real hard and we succeeded in the negotiations to install the principle of complementarity, that's an American-made product-

Brian Hanson: Yeah, and what does that mean? It sounds like a great lawyer term. What's that mean?

David Scheffer: That means that the prosecutor will defer to your national investigation and prosecution of individuals who might be implicated in these atrocity crimes and leave the work to you, your national process. It's only when you've totally failed to take up that challenge and you allow these crimes to go uninvestigated and unpunished, that the prosecutor says, well, I've got jurisdiction so I will seize it now. I've given you a chance, you blew it, I now step in. We negotiated that. That was our proposal. Why? Because we have enormous confidence in the US legal system, just as Mr. Bolton said but we said it in a totally different context, which is we're so confident of our system that if these types of crimes occur, torture, inhumane treatment, even rape, is allegedly Afghan detention cases which involve about 88 persons, the United States will investigate. We have court-martials, we have ways of doing this and we will demonstrate to you that we have done so. This was a protection for state parties, as well as for nonstate parties who might be wrapped into jurisdiction this way.

David Scheffer: So my response to all of this is, well, I assume we did not commit these crimes. I mean, if we did, have they been properly investigated and prosecuted? Because, I'm sorry, the United State's government is condoning the commission of these crimes, where are we now? What happened?

Brian Hanson: This is interesting because you wrote a piece for the Chicago Council on Global affairs last week, before Bolton talked, on developments in International Criminal Court, and your argument there, in that piece, is that we should cooperate with the investigation. I assume it ties into this complementarity idea, so what would cooperating mean? What would that strategy look like?

David Scheffer: It would be consultations directly with the prosecutor, obviously confidential, not public consultations. We did this with the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, the Kosovo conflict in the late 90s-

Brian Hanson: That US troops were involved in?

David Scheffer: Well, the prosecutor was saying that the Yugoslav tribunal, you bombed a lot of Serbia and I've got to take a look at this, and so we were kind of angry that she was asking us, what, you're questioning our bombing campaign on the Kosovo conflict? But we sat down for several months and we worked it out. We explained every site, every hit and we were never officially investigated thereafter by the Yugoslav tribunal. Why? Because we had pride in the performance of our military forces, we had no hesitancy to discuss the legitimacy of their actions, we worked it out, and the prosecutor walked away.

David Scheffer: Now, I would say if we have pride and confidence in what happened in Afghanistan and at the black sites, step forward and talk about it. Just talk about it. Bring the evidence to the table. Do not be intimidated by the Court. This is what I find so startling about the Bolton speech is it's a singular statement of being intimidated for the security of American forces, but I would say if you really want to secure American Forces, do it the right way under the rule of law.

Brian Hanson: And National Security Advisor Bolton said we shouldn't cooperate, that that would only give legitimacy to this action, going after US troops. Where do you find his argument wrongheaded?

David Scheffer: Wrongheaded because we actually negotiated the complementarity regime for exactly this purpose, namely a nonparty state who does get wrapped up in the jurisdiction, because this is on state party territory for different state parties. Yes, protect that nonparty state by allowing it to come forward and completely invoke complementarity and say, yeah, we'll talk to you about this, this what we're doing, we're handling this, we're investigating ts, we closed these investigations. When I was talked about this I said, the prosecutor should proceed not only with investigations but only where merited with prosecutions, and the key to complementarity is to convince her that there's no merit whatsoever to proceed with prosecutions.

David Scheffer: Now, if the United States is hiding something and several officials are actually deeply involved and implicated in acts of torture, well, we have to do something about that. Otherwise, again, I would just say, well, does that represent the United States of America? Does that represent the U.S. Constitution? Does that represent the rule of law? Is that something you want to defend, acts of torture? Is that your agenda? If that is your gender, then it is a rebuttable agenda.

Brian Hanson: John Bolton is taking this very hard stand, he's talked about sanctions, he's talked about arresting people who were involved in investigations and possible prosecutions of U.S. forces and also talked about our allies and particularly, charges brought against Israel and actions they've taken with respect to the Palestinians, what is the effect of him making that kind of threat? Is it just a speech that gets a lot of headlines and goes away? Or, is there something important here?

David Scheffer: The important point is, first, it's unprecedented. It is so emblematic of how authoritarian regimes, when you want something really done you go after the people who are bothering you. You go after judges and prosecutors. This is what happens in authoritarian regimes. It's the first step towards, many would argue, towards fascism. Although I don't want to put that on his head, but the point is when I saw that or heard it, I thought my God, that's exactly what an authoritarian regime would do is to go after the judges and prosecutors. So it's a very unusual step and frankly, I am not certain where he gets the authority to do that under U.S. law. I think that would be challenged immediately in the federal courts unless he had some statute to work with that gives him that authority. I wonder whether there will be an executive order that tries to implement this, but just as with the separation of the families along the border, there will be court challenges to any step of this nature.

David Scheffer: Imagine you're sitting in the government of an authoritarian state where the interests of that state are before U.S. federal court somewhere on some case, and there are lots of them, lots of transnational cases are in federal courts right now where government interests are at stake, foreign government interests, well, they'll say, hey, okay, I'm sorry that federal judge, that U.S. attorney, we're going to make sure they cannot travel anywhere in the world. We're going to put an Interpol arrest warrant out on them, we're going to freeze any assets they may have in our country, depending on what was going on. The point is he's opened up a reciprocal bag of punitive steps against the United States that authoritarian regimes, or even non-authoritarian regimes could easily say our interests are at stake and we will now punish the actual judicial officials dealing with it.

Brian Hanson: One of the things that Bolton's speech raises is a question that was asked by another person from our Facebook group, a listener, Jake [Eckdal 00:23:43], who says can the ICC realistically enforce international law if the U.S. refuses to participate? So, if this does become the position of the United States, is more than a speech carried forward, what's that mean for international law?

David Scheffer: I think the International Criminal Court will proceed. One of the inaccuracies in the speech is that it's dying and then he says it's dead, well, both of those statements are totally false. In fact, I think a large body of member states of the Court have simply moved. They're not anticipating U.S. participation. Many of them actually do not want U.S. participation as far as I can tell, because it comes with too much baggage. So the court will simply move forward. The president of the assembly of states parties of the Court issued a statement immediately after the Bolton speech saying, well, we're just going to keep doing what we're mandated to do here, and so I don't think this is going to derail the International Criminal Court. It may cause moments of pause by the Court or by member states, but I'm quite confident the horror of it will pass. The Court has more than enough work to proceed with.

Brian Hanson: It's interesting in domestic political terms here, the Council does an annual survey of public opinion and one of the things we've been asking about for over last 20 years is about public attitudes toward the International Criminal Court, and we just this summer did our annual survey and we found actually, an increased support in the United States for the ICC. The overall level the U.S., 74% of the public says they support US involvement with the ICC, so there seems to be a disconnect between public opinion and this administration, and I want to ask you a question as somebody who's been working in this area for decades, heavily involved in it, is there something that has changed in the 1990s as a very compelling issue? There's still public support for it at the popular opinion level, but the politics seem to be different, what's changed?

David Scheffer: Well, I think what's changed is in part the shift towards a more extremist vision of our engagement in the world, a more isolationist view of our engagement in the world, and that's plays out in Washington, but I think in the rest of the country ... The rest of the country does believe in the rule of law, if I may put it so generally. It is the bedrock of America, it is the bedrock of our democratic system, and the International Criminal Court represents that.

David Scheffer: I have to make this point with respect to the safety of our American service-members, and I think the public sees this, the whole thrust of the International Criminal Court is not to impose, to influence greater adherence to the law to international humanitarian law to these principles of behavior on the battlefield and with respect to civilian populations, that helps secure our Armed Forces because the more you can instill that understanding and perception globally, the more our Armed Forces are actually protected. That's the whole issue to [inaudible 00:27:47] systems and all these educational programs the military does around the world is to instruct militaries how do you fight wars legally, how do you protect your people legally. And so by undercutting it, by withdrawing from the International Criminal Court and saying this doesn't matter, I am afraid that it's counterintuitive because it actually endangers our forces more than it protects them. There's a long-range vision behind the International Criminal Court and behind international law, and when you strip that away, when you dismantle it, then in fact, you're creating more insecure situations and conditions for our Armed Forces around the world. I think the American people understand that sort of instinctively, yes, rule of law that is good for us, it's good for our forces.

Brian Hanson: You talk about the ICC going forward without us and one of the things I thought was absolutely fascinating in this working paper that you wrote for the Council called Critical Rulings on International Criminal Justice, which is available on our website, is that you talked about a case currently being considered by the ICC about the Rohingya, tell us about ... Again, this is a case where some other country is being also involved, so this is a group, and there's been a great Deep Dish episode on this population that was forcibly displaced from the Myanmar with a great deal of violence and the UN has done an investigation and talked about ethnic cleansing, and even used the word genocide I believe, forcing this population into war crimes, forcing this population into Myanmar. Again, it's forcing this population into Bangladesh, in the neighboring Bangladesh. Myanmar is not a signatory to this treaty, so what is the issue here and how might it implicate the U.S. in the long run?

David Scheffer: Well, it's a very important decision last week by one of the pretrial chambers of the Court. It brought to the forefront a dilemma that we have had ever since August if 2017, how could the International Criminal Court exercise jurisdiction over the Rohingya situation, which is so disastrous, more than 700,000 Rohingya pushed across the border into Bangladesh? The Security Council has not referred that situation to the Court, Russia and China would presumably not permit that to happen, so it's a dilemma in terms of accountability.

David Scheffer: The prosecutor asked the judges of the Court, do I have any possible jurisdiction over the Rohingya situation, and the answer that we learned last week is, yes. Let me give you this very briefly and then how it affects the United States. Myanmar is not a state party, so it feels it can do anything it wants to on its territory against its citizens, and this involved massive ethnic cleansing, massive inhumane treatment, etc., and rapes, mass rapes, and Bangladesh, however, is a member state of the Court. It's a state party. The crime of deportation and forcible transfer of the deportation part of that crime has to involve two states, you have the state where it starts and the state where it ends, so the fact that more than 700,000 Rohingya were deported very aggressively onto Bangladesh territory, accompanied by crimes of ethnic cleansing, inhumane treatment, all of these are in Rome statute, means that these crimes became transnational and became very much a part of what's occurring on the territory of a state party, Bangladesh. Well, that, the judges found, triggers the jurisdiction, so the prosecutor is now authorized to proceed with a request to open an official investigation. I mean, there are all these steps at the Court where you have to get the judges to agree, but now she has that latitude to do so. This is extremely significant.

David Scheffer: Take Syria, Syria is a nonparty state, it literally deported hundreds of thousands of people to state party territory, Greece, Jordan, Italy, most of Europe, Germany took almost a million, so it opens up the possibility that Syria could fall within the jurisdiction of the Court now.

Brian Hanson: This is interesting, the U.S., we've had a deportation issue that's very prominent in the news with the Trump administration, deportation, and including family separation as part of this, so have does this have implications for us?

David Scheffer: Well, if you look at what has happened along the Mexican border, it depends ... I don't want to say it actually triggers it now because you really have to look at how individuals were "deported" from the United States back to Mexico and other parts of Central America, etc. as part of this family separation thing, but it does raise the question, are we dumping a crime onto Mexican territory or Guatemala? All these are state parties to the Court so we do have to be careful, these are transnational crimes. So it does raise that issue and it's a matter, which frankly is a new one for us to consider. I think it sort of reflects the fact that you can't keep trying to run away from progress in law and its reach. You can't just keep pushing it away and say no, I don't believe it exists. These things are evolving and frankly, I wish the United States were at the Court helping to influence all if this. Why wasn't there a U.S. judge on the pretrial chamber? We can't have any judges there, we're out of the picture. We cannot have any prosecutor of US nationality-

Brian Hanson: Because we're not part of the system.

David Scheffer: We're not there. We've run away. We've run away from the challenges of international justice. We're so intimidated by it, it seems. Whereas other countries are saying we're going to be in the room. In fact, even nonparty states like Russia, and Israel, and China, when there are these conferences, those nonparty states always are there as observer states because they know they should be in the room. I wonder now during the Obama administration, we were there in the room as an observer state again, finally, after the George W. Bush years where we weren't, and I wonder now under the Trump administration, are we not showing up at these meetings of the assembly of states parties where our voice can be very clearly heard as an observer? Or, we just abandon the site and we don't present our arguments? I would strongly believe that, as Mr. Bolton said, the righteousness of ... He quoted FDR on the righteousness of the United States and its allies, well, there's the righteousness of our point of view of our arguments, of our rationale, and you have to be in the room to state it, you cannot be outside of the room.

Brian Hanson: David, this conversation has been incredibly helpful for getting deeper than the headline of the Bolton speech and the immediate reaction so I really appreciate that, as we close, what would you encourage our listeners to pay attention to? There will no doubt be headlines coming and going, but to understand the progress of the ICC and international criminal justice what should people pay attention to?

David Scheffer: I think they should pay attention to the continuing reality of massive atrocity crimes occurring in many parts of the world and the failure of the system to properly react quickly enough to those crimes to try to stop them, and that's a huge area of prevention of these crimes that we haven't talked about, but part of the purpose of this Court is to instill an attitude among governments to prevent these crimes before they reach levels of accountability before the Court. I think we need to pay much more attention to the power that we have as the United States to actually prevent atrocity crimes rather than just let them go on and then say well I don't care about the accountability for them, that's just the way it is elsewhere in the world. So I would hope that we could focus on that, but also focus on, frankly, the legitimacy of the judgments that do come down from the Court. There are individuals who committed these crimes, who are on trial, and it is a Criminal Court there are very high standards that are national due process, and just take seriously the professionalism of this Court. Yes, there are moments of corruption or misbehavior, that's true frankly in all court systems, it's not unique to the International Criminal Court ... My goodness, the other war crimes tribunals had great moments of that character, but we supported them and they achieved their mandates. So I would argue the United States is built by the founders of the Constitution on the rule of law ... Remember, treaty law is the supreme law of the land under the U.S. Constitution, and I would just say that the International Criminal Court is built upon treaty law with respect to the character of the crimes at issue and it's built upon the principles of due process that we hold so dear in this system. We should not be fearful of that. We should embrace it and be there to contribute to it.

Brian Hanson: Ambassador David Scheffer who helped negotiate the International Criminal Court for the United States. Thanks very much for being on Deep Dish it's been good to have you.

David Scheffer: Thank you.

Brian Hanson: And thank you for tuning into this episode of Deep Dish. As a reminder, the opinions you heard today belong to the people who expressed them and not the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. You can find our show under Deep Dish on Global Affairs wherever you listen to podcasts. If you like the show, please let us know by tapping the subscribe button so that you can get each new episode when it comes out. If you think you know someone who would benefit from today's episode, please tap the share button and send it to them. If you have questions about anything you heard today or if you want to submit questions for upcoming guests and episodes, please join our Facebook group, Deed Dish on Global Affairs.

Brian Hanson: This episode of Deep Dish was produced by Evan Fazio, our audio engineer is Andy Zarnecky, I'm Brian Hanson, and we'll be back soon with another slice of Deep Dish.