The Obama administration announced a major rebalance toward Asia in 2011 to strengthen US relations with Asian countries on several dimensions, from security to trade. The American public supports the idea of rebalancing toward Asia. They also endorse a broad range of current US involvement in Asia, including sustaining regional alliances, maintaining an overseas US military presence, and signing free trade agreements. While Americans continue to support friendly relations with China, they express some discomfort about the economic impact of China’s rise and place a higher priority on relations with traditional allies.

Key Findings

Asia

- Six in ten Americans (60%) support the US government’s plans to rebalance diplomatic and military resources away from the Middle East and Europe and more toward Asia.

- A solid majority of Americans (62%) say that the US military presence in East Asia increases regional stability.

- Two in three Americans say globalization is mostly good (65%) and support the Trans-Pacific Partnership (63%).

- Six in ten (59%) place a higher priority on cementing relations with existing regional allies than on building a new partnership with China.

Japan

- American favorability ratings of Japan are at an all-time high at 62 out of 100, where higher numbers mean a more positive rating.

- A majority of Americans (55%) support long-term US military bases in Japan.

- Six in ten Americans (62%) correctly recognize that Japan is one of America’s top 10 trading partners.

South Korea

- American favorability ratings of South Korea are also at an all-time high at 55 out of 100.

- More than six in ten Americans (64%) say the United States should have long-term military bases in South Korea.

- If North Korea were to attack South Korea, nearly half of Americans (47%) support sending US troops to defend South Korea, the highest recorded level of support since 1974.
China

- Americans remain somewhat cool on China, giving it an average favorability rating of 44 out of 100.
- Two in three Americans (67%) continue to say the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China.
- A plurality of Americans believe that China (45%) is a stronger economic power than the United States. But a majority thinks the United States is the stronger military power (54% vs. 14% who say China).

Taiwan

- On a scale of 0 to 100, Americans give Taiwan a favorability rating of 52.
- Americans tend to support maintaining military aid to Taiwan (46%), but only one in four (26%) would favor sending US troops to defend Taiwan if China were to invade.

North Korea

- On a scale of 0 to 100, North Korea scores an average favorability rating of 23, the lowest of all nations presented.
- Yet, a majority of Americans (61%) think US leaders should be ready to meet and talk with North Korean leaders.
- A large majority (85%) supports diplomatic attempts to persuade North Korea to stop building its nuclear weapon capabilities.
- Two-thirds of Americans (66%) support interdiction efforts to search North Korean ships for nuclear materials or arms.

Majority Supports Rebalance to Asia

More now than in 2012 support the rebalance to Asia.

Three years ago Secretary of State Hilary Clinton announced the US rebalance toward Asia in an article in Foreign Policy titled “America’s Pacific Century.” Results from the 2014 Chicago Council Survey show that the American public increasingly favors this strategy.

Currently six in ten (60%) support the US government’s plans to rebalance our diplomatic and military resources away from the Middle East and Europe and more toward Asia, up from 54 percent in 2012.

When survey respondents who support the pivot to Asia are asked their reasons for doing so (in an open-ended question), many Americans refer to Asia’s growth, size, and economic importance. One respondent explains, “Asia in general and China in specific are rising nations, and it’s in our best interest to secure their political and economic cooperation now rather than later.” Others point out that alliances in Asia are in the best interest of the United States, with greater potential for mutual and lasting cooperation. Another participant elaborated, “Many Asian countries are currently or emerging as powerful economic and geographic entities with potential for a strong military presence. Engaging with these countries as they evolve is more likely to result in the establishment of political and economic systems that mirror and/or are beneficial to US interests.”

The survey question implies a tradeoff in pivoting to Asia and away from the Middle East, and therefore many respondents underscore perceptions of greater stability in Asia relative to the Middle East. As one participant put it, “Intervention in the Middle East has been mostly negative (violent) and has only resulted in negative outcomes for the United States; engaging in Asia is an opportunity for economic growth and to make a positive impression on that part of the world.” Several respondents also note the possible advantages of rebalancing to hedge against looming threats in the region, including Chinese territorial encroachments.

Importance of Asia versus Europe has fluctuated.

While Americans are willing to shift resources away from the Middle East, a slight majority now says that Europe (55%) is more important to the United States than Asia (44%). This signals a reversal of opinion from 2012, when 52 percent of Americans thought Asia was more important than Europe (47%). Despite oscillations in recent years, the trend in opinion is clear. The gap between the importance of the two regions has narrowed significantly since 2002 and has been steady since 2006 (figure 1). Those under 29 years of age, those with higher incomes, and those with more education are more likely to say that Asia is more
important. Americans who support the pivot to Asia are as likely to say that Asia is more important (51%) as they are to say that Europe is more important (49%). Those who oppose the pivot (34% overall) are more likely to believe that Europe is more important (67% vs. 32% Asia).

**A majority believes that the US military presence in East Asia increases regional stability.**

A majority of Americans (62%, up from 59% in 2012) say that the US military presence in East Asia increases regional stability (32% disagree). The public also supports maintaining US military bases in South Korea (64%), Japan (55%), and the Philippines (51%).

Americans may see this presence as important because of concerns about regional tensions. Six in ten consider border disputes between China and its neighbors an important (but not critical) threat to the United States; another 19 percent say it is a critical threat. And Americans are also aware of the potential threat from North Korea. The 2012 Chicago Council Survey found that when presented with a list of strategic priorities in Asia, Americans named preventing North Korea from building its nuclear capabilities as the most important regional goal.

Pew Research Center results in 2014 show that publics in Asia also express concern that territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries could lead to military conflict, including majorities of Chinese (47% somewhat concerned, 15% very concerned), Japanese (44% somewhat, 41% very) and South Korean publics (53% somewhat, 30% very).

**A majority supports the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.**

With continued recovery from the 2008 economic crisis, two in three Americans (65%) now say that globalization is mostly good for the United States—the highest level recorded in Chicago Council Surveys since the question was first asked in 1998. Further, seven in ten Americans (72%) say that trade agreements in general are an effective way to achieve US foreign policy goals. As a reflection of these views, six in ten (63%) support the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or TPP), a free trade agreement that the United States is currently negotiating with 12 Pacific nations. Half (52%) say they somewhat support the TPP, with an additional one in ten (11%) saying they strongly support it. Three in ten say they oppose the agreement (22% somewhat opposed, 9% strongly opposed).

Support for trade agreements also reflects favorable American views of its trading partnerships in Asia. The 2012 Chicago Council Survey found that six in ten Americans (63%) thought Japan practiced fair trade with the United States, and over half said the same of South Korea (53%). China, in contrast, was seen as an unfair trader (67% vs. 29% fair trader).
Public opposes spying on Japan, South Korea; favors espionage against China, North Korea.

Edward Snowden’s flight to Hong Kong and eventual departure to Russia made headlines last year and brought the issue of US government surveillance to the fore in many US bilateral relationships. A majority of Americans say it is more important for the federal government to investigate possible terrorist threats, even if that intrudes on personal privacy (68%). But Americans oppose the US government secretly spying on allies in Asia (figure 2). Six in ten oppose the US government spying on the Japanese government (63%), a sharp change from 53 percent who supported spying on Tokyo in 1994, likely because of American perceptions of an economic threat from Japan at that time. Six in ten (57%) currently also oppose spying on the South Korean government.

By contrast, a majority of Americans support the US government secretly spying on the Chinese (70%) and North Korean governments (79%). This support was much the same in 1994, when 67 percent of the public supported spying on the Chinese government, and 66 percent said the same of North Korea.

Relations with traditional allies are seen as more important than building a new partnership with China.

While other results show that Americans favor a cooperative approach toward China, Americans place a higher priority on cementing relations with existing regional allies rather than building new ties with China (figure 3). In line with past readings, six in ten Americans (59%) say that the United States should place a higher priority on “building up our strong relations with traditional allies like South Korea and Japan, even if this might diminish our relations with China.” One in three (33%) take the opposite stance, saying the United States should prioritize “building a new partnership with China, even if this might diminish our relations with our traditional allies.”
Japanese have strongly positive feelings toward Japan.

American favorability toward Japan is at an all-time high. On a 0 to 100 scale of “feelings” toward other countries, Americans rate Japan an average of 62, the highest recorded rating since this question was first included in the 1978 Chicago Council Survey (figure 4).

In addition to feeling warmly towards Japan, Americans overwhelmingly describe the US-Japan relationship as a partnership (80%) rather than a rivalry (16%) (figure 5). Americans recognize, however, that the relationship between Japan and China is quite different, with seven in ten describing the Japan-China relationship as a rivalry (72%) rather than a partnership (24%) (figure 6).

Goodwill between Americans and Japanese is mutual; Japanese are wary of neighbors.

According to 2014 Pew Research Center results, the Japanese public reciprocates the warm feelings that Americans have toward them, with 66 percent expressing a favorable view of the United States. Japanese opinion of the United States was even higher in 2011, when 85 percent rated the United States favorably, reflecting appreciation for American relief efforts following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

Japanese views of China, however, reflect historical animosity. Genron NPO 2014 polls conducted in Japan show just 7 percent of the public views China favorably (Pew surveys found the same percentage in their 2014 Japan survey). In addition, Genron NPO polls
show that three in four Japanese (76%) say China is untrustworthy, and a majority (64%) considers China a military threat. But much like Americans, the Japanese public favors cooperation with China on important issues in Asia (60%) and say the Japan-China relationship is important (71%).

The Genron NPO survey shows that the Japanese have cool feelings toward neighbor South Korea as well (54% unfavorable, 21% favorable, 25% neither). Only 5 percent think that current Japan-South Korea relations are good. This represents a further decline in favorability from 2013, when opinion was more divided (37% unfavorable, 31% favorable, 32% neither).

**Japanese influence is expected to increase.**

Americans expect Japan to become slightly more influential over the next 10 years. When asked to rate the nation’s influence in the world on a scale from 0 to 10, Americans rate Japan an average of 6.3, broadly consistent with readings over the past decade, and just above Russia’s rating of 6.2 (figure 7). In 10 years, Americans expect Japanese global influence to grow slightly, from 6.3 to 6.4. This, too, is largely consistent with past predictions.

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**Americans strongly support US bases in Japan.**

The United States has stationed troops in Japan since the end of the Second World War. Since that time, the United States Forces Japan has been responsible for Japan’s defense in coordination with the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Today, approximately 50,000 US military personnel remain stationed in Japan, most on the island of Okinawa. As has been the case for the past decade, a majority of Americans (55%) support long-term US military bases in Japan (figure 8). Support for these bases dipped to half in 2010, perhaps in reaction to Japanese protests in Okinawa over a US base relocation. But support has since recovered.

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1. The decline in public support for bases in 2010 was not limited to Japan—support for military bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany, and Turkey declined between 2008 and 2010 by an average of nearly 7 percentage points. The rebound in support may reflect the stronger American economy following the severe recession that followed the 2008 Chicago Council Survey.
According to a Associated Press-GfK study in 2011, a majority of the Japanese public (57%) supported American military bases in their country. This marked an increase of 10 points from 2005, when the Japanese public was divided on the issue.

A majority of Americans know Japan is a key trading partner.

In addition to its status as a central member of the US alliance system in Asia, Japan is also a major trading partner with the United States, ranking fourth according to June 2014 US Census Bureau figures. Six in ten Americans (62%) correctly say that Japan is one of America’s top 10 trading partners. However, nearly three in ten (28%) incorrectly say that Japan is a top 20 trading partner, but not a top 10 partner. An additional 7 percent say that Japan is not in the top 20 of US trading partners. Knowledge of Japan’s trading partner status has grown since 2012. Then, only 56 percent of Americans correctly identified Japan as a top 10 trading partner.

South Korea

In the US-ROK relationship, friendly feelings prevail on both sides.

Among the American public, favorability of South Korea is also at an all-time high. On a scale of 0 to 100, Americans rate South Korea a 55, the highest average since the question was first asked in 1978 (figure 9). Seven in ten Americans (70%) also say that the United States and South Korea are mostly partners (rather than rivals), up from 65 percent in 2012. About one in four consider the United States and South Korea rivals (27%), similar to opinion in 2012 (when 29 percent said they were mostly rivals).

South Koreans are favorable toward the United States, but wary of neighbors.

South Koreans are also favorable toward the United States. Asan Institute surveys of the Korean public have consistently registered positive ratings for the United States. On a scale of 0 to 10, with favorability increasing toward 10, the United States is the only country asked about that consistently scores above a 5, and in 2014 polling it averaged a 5.9. In addition, eight in ten (79%) South Koreans view the US-Korea relationship as cooperative (versus competitive). By comparison,
Americans affirm ties to allies in Asia

South Koreans currently rate China an average of 4.8 and Japan an average of 2.5 out of 10.2

Reinforcing their positive feelings toward the United States, a majority (57%) of South Koreans believe that strengthening cooperative relations with the United States is more important than strengthening relations with China (30%). And a narrow majority (53%) agrees that Korea should strengthen the alliance with the United States even at the risk of making China uncomfortable.

**Americans expect South Korea’s influence to increase.**

Americans expect South Korea to become slightly more influential over the next 10 years. When asked to rate the nation’s influence in the world on a scale from 0 to 10, Americans rated South Korea an average of 4.7, just below India at 4.8. This is an increase from the 4.4 rating Americans gave to South Korea in 2012. And in 10 years, Americans expect South Korea’s influence to grow from 4.7 to 4.9.

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2. Additionally, 2014 Genron NPO survey results show that nearly eight in ten South Koreans (78%) have an unfavorable view of Japan (12% favorable).

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**Both sides support United States Forces Korea.**

US troops have been stationed in South Korea since the Korean War over 60 years ago. Today, 28,500 US soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines remain as part of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Among the many locations asked about in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, South Korea remains the most popular overseas base location for the American public. Two-thirds of Americans (64%) say that the United States should have long-term military bases in South Korea, a finding that has been consistent over the past decade (figure 10).

A 2014 Asan poll found that a large majority of South Koreans continue to see the ROK-US alliance as necessary in the future (93%), even after a potential reunification with the North (66%, down from 84% in 2012). Asan’s 2012 poll showed that South Koreans also continued to support the long-term US military presence (68%).

**Public divided on defending ROK against North Korean attack.**

While Americans clearly value their alliance with South Korea and support basing US troops in the country, the public is divided over whether or not they would support sending US troops to defend South Korea in the event of a North Korean invasion. While half (51%) oppose doing so, 47 percent support sending US troops
to defend South Korea, the highest recorded level of support since the first Chicago Council Survey in 1974 (figure 11). Many Americans may not be aware of the US treaty obligations to Asian allies or may believe that South Korea is capable of defending itself. Yet South Koreans are less sure. Asan’s 2012 survey reported that large majorities of South Koreans did not think South Korea could deter North Korea without any help from the United States (75%) or win a war against the North without any help from its allies (74%).

South Korea is underappreciated as a US trading partner.

South Korea’s role as a top trading partner of the United States is not well known among the American public. Only one in four (24%) correctly identify South Korea as a top 10 trading partner of the United States. A plurality (44%) instead say that South Korea is a top 20 trading partner, but not in the top 10. An additional 26 percent claim that South Korea is not among America’s top 20 trading partners. In fact, South Korea ranks just above the United Kingdom in sixth place, accord-
According to June 2014 US Census Bureau figures. Clearly, Americans are not yet aware of South Korea’s heft as a world trader. However, in 2012 a majority of Americans (53%) said that South Korea practiced fair trade with the United States (43% felt trade was unfair).

**China**

**Americans are cool on China.**

Americans’ favorability ratings of China remain slightly negative. On a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being a very unfavorable feeling and 100 being a very favorable feeling, Americans give China an average rating of 44 (figure 12). This is consistent with past ratings dating back to 1978. The only year in which China broke above a 50 was in 1986, the last Chicago Council Survey before the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Americans remain divided on whether the United States and China are partners or rivals, with 48 percent saying the two are mostly rivals, and 49 percent saying they are mostly partners.

By comparison, a 2014 Pew Research survey shows that the Chinese public leans toward a favorable view of the United States (50% favorable, 43% unfavorable). Nevertheless, a 2012 survey commissioned by the Committee of 100 conducted in both China and the United States showed that there is ample distrust on both sides. A bare majority of Americans in that survey said that China is untrustworthy (51% vs. 48% trustworthy). And a clear majority of the Chinese distrusted the United States (56%, 35% trustworthy).

Results from a 2014 Genron NPO survey show that the Chinese are even more skeptical of Japan. Nine in ten (87%) express an unfavorable view of Japan, and two in three (67%) say that Japan-China relations are bad. But majorities of both publics say that bilateral relations are important (71% in Japan, 65% in China).

**Americans recognize China’s ascent, but still see the United States as most influential.**

Americans continue to believe that the United States is the most influential country in the world today, rating it an average of 8.6 out of 10, with larger numbers representing greater influence. But China is a close second at an average influence rating of 7.4. And while Americans expect US influence to decline over the next 10 years and Chinese influence to grow, they still see the United States as the more influential country in the future. On a scale of 0 to 10, Americans estimate China’s influence in the world in 10 years at an average of 7.6, while giving the United States an average of 8.2.
Americans are distantly concerned about the threat from China; Chinese are more concerned about the United States.

Since 2004 only about four in ten Americans have considered China’s development as a world power a critical threat to the vital interest of the United States, compared to nearly six in ten during the 1990s (figure 13). Similarly, while Americans consider border disputes between China and its neighbors an important threat to the United States, only 19 percent say they are a critical threat. But in a 2014 Pew survey that asks Americans which country poses the greatest threat to the United States, China is in the top three (23% Russia, 19% China, 16% Iran, 7% North Korea).

The 2014 Genron NPO poll shows that the Chinese public feels threatened by the United States (58%, down from 72% in 2013) as well as Japan (55%). The Pew 2014 results from China corroborate these findings, with the majority of Chinese choosing either the United States (36%) or Japan (33%) as most likely to pose a threat to China in the future, far above India, the third-highest country at a mere 2 percent.

Americans see a greater economic than military threat from China.

Nearly eight in ten Americans say that economic strength (77%) is more important than military power (23%) in determining a country’s overall power and influence in the world—more than have ever said so in the past. Perhaps as a result, many seem uncomfortable with China’s economic rise.

A plurality of the public (47%) says the effects of China’s economy growing as large the US economy would be equally positive and negative, but four in ten (41%) say it would be mostly negative (10% mostly positive). Nearly half (47%) also say that US debt to China represents a critical threat to US vital interests, more than the percentage who say the same about China’s development as a world power or China’s border disputes with its neighbors.

In fact, a plurality of Americans (45%) say that China is already stronger economically than the United States, compared to 27 percent who say the US is stronger economically. Another 26 percent say the two nations are about equally powerful economically (figure 14). By contrast, a 2014 Pew survey shows that
a majority of Chinese (55%) say that the United States remains the world’s leading economic power; only one in four Chinese say China is in the lead.

At the same time, Americans believe that the United States still has the military advantage. A slight majority (54%) says the United States is militarily stronger than China, while a third (32%) say the two are about equal. Only 14 percent see China as militarily more powerful than the United States (figure 14).

**On China, Americans support engagement, not containment.**

In dealing with the rise of China’s power, two in three Americans (67%) say the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. Three in ten (29%) take the opposite position, saying the United States should actively work to limit the growth of China. This has been a consistent stance among the American public since the Council first asked the question in 2006 (figure 15).

**Taiwan**

**Americans are tepid on Taiwan.**

Though the US government does not recognize Taiwan as an independent nation, it maintains an extensive “unofficial” relationship, which includes arms sales and a robust trade relationship. Despite the depths of the political and economic ties, the American public has been consistently ambivalent about Taiwan. On the scale of favorability from 0 to 100, Americans have consistently rated Taiwan between a 48 and a 52 on average since 1978 (figure 16). Taiwan’s 2014 average rating of 52 places it below other US allies in the region such as Japan (62) and South Korea (55), but above China (44) and far above North Korea (23).

**Most Americans support military aid to Taiwan.**

Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which governs US relations with the island, the United States is obligated to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities.” In line with this policy, Americans tend to support providing military aid to Taiwan, with a plurality (46%) saying the current level of aid should be maintained, and 7 percent saying it should be increased. Two in ten (20%) favor decreasing military aid to Taiwan, and 22 percent say it should be stopped altogether.

The Taiwanese public would like US support to focus on other areas, however. In a 2014 Taiwan Security Research (TISR) survey, when asked which of three options would be the most helpful way the United States could assist Taiwan—selling defensive arms to Taiwan, strengthening trade relations with Taiwan, or assisting Taiwan in joining international organizations—almost half of Taiwanese respondents say it would be most helpful for the United States to assist Taiwan in joining international organizations (49%). Roughly one-third (35%) opts for strengthening trade relations, while a mere 4 percent select arms sales.
The US public opposes sending troops to defend Taiwan from a cross-strait invasion.

While supportive of maintaining military aid, Americans have always been reluctant to commit American troops to the defense of Taiwan. Seven in ten Americans (71%) say they would oppose sending troops, while a quarter (26%) would favor sending troops to defend Taiwan. Support for doing so peaked in 2004, when only one in three Americans (33%) favored deploying troops (figure 17).

North Korea

North Korea is Americans’ least favorite nation.

Of all the nations asked about in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, Americans give North Korea the lowest favorability ratings of all. On a scale of 0 to 100, North Korea scores a 23. This is tied for the lowest rating ever given to North Korea since the question was first asked in 1978. The only nations ever to rate lower than this were Iraq in 1990 after the invasion of Kuwait, and Iran.
in 1986. Despite these negative feelings, a majority of the American public (61%) says that the United States should be willing to meet and talk with North Korean leaders, consistent with attitudes going back to 2008.

**Americans support efforts to pressure North Korea on nuclear weapons.**

Reflecting Americans’ concerns about nuclear proliferation, the US public is willing to pursue a variety of measures to address North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The most widely supported approach, favored by the vast majority of Americans (85%), is continuing diplomatic efforts to get North Korea to suspend its nuclear program (figure 18).

Public support for antiproliferation measures also extends beyond negotiations. Two in three (66%) Americans support stopping and searching North Korean ships for nuclear materials or arms. Four in ten Americans (41%) say they would support air strikes against military targets and suspected nuclear sites in North Korea, while a majority (55%) opposes doing so. Only two in ten (18%) would support sending in US ground troops to take control of the country, an action opposed by the majority of the public (78%). Though overall concern about nuclear proliferation has declined since 2012, support for all of these courses of action has risen between three and six percentage points over the past two years.

**Conclusion**

Americans support US involvement in Asia and seem to think that US regional efforts positively affect stability. South Korean and Japanese publics support existing US bases in their countries, and in turn, Americans support maintaining that military presence. But Americans are either uninformed about treaty obligations or unwilling to commit US troops to Asian allies’ defense.

While Americans are aware of tensions in the region, the threat of territorial disputes is naturally felt much more strongly among Asian publics. Many publics in the region seem to trust the United States more than their immediate neighbors. Taken together, these findings suggest that the United States’ regional role has staying power for the near future.

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This report is based on the results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, commissioned by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The 2014 edition of the survey is the latest effort in a series of wide-ranging surveys on American attitudes towards US foreign policy.

The survey was conducted from May 6 to 29, 2014, among a representative national sample of 2,108 adults, including an oversample of 311 Hispanic respondents. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is +/- 2.5, including a design effect of 1.46.

The survey was conducted by GfK Custom Research, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Palo Alto, California. The survey was fielded to a total of 3,905 panel members, including 759 in the Hispanic oversample, yielding a total of 2,243 completed surveys. Of the total completes, 1,914 were from the main sample (a completion rate of 61%) and 339 were from the Hispanic oversample (a completion rate of 45%). The median survey length was 37 minutes.

Of the 2,243 total completed surveys, 142 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 2,108 respondents. Respondents were excluded if they failed at least one of three key checks:

1. Respondents who completed the survey in 10 minutes or less.
2. Respondents who refused to answer half of the items in the survey or more.
3. Respondents who failed three or four of the following:
   a. Completed the survey in 10 minutes or less.
   b. Did not accurately input “4,” refused or skipped the question that was specifically designed to make sure respondents were paying attention. (“In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select number 4 from the list below.”)
   c. Refused one or more full lists that included five items or more (of which there were 22 such lists).
   d. Respondents who gave exactly the same answer (“straight-lined”) to every item on one of the four longest lists in the survey (Q5, Q7, Q50 or Q55).

The survey was fielded using a randomly selected sample of GfK’s large-scale nationwide research panel, KnowledgePanel®. Prior to April 2009, the panel was recruited using stratified random digit dialing (RDD).
telephone sampling, and now uses address-based sampling (ABS) to cover the growing number of cell-phone-only households (approximately 97% of households are covered this way). Currently, 40 percent of panel members were recruited through RDD, 60 percent with ABS.

For both RDD and ABS recruitment, households that agree to participate in the panel are provided with free Internet hardware and access (if necessary), which uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and the television as a monitor. Thus, the sample is not limited to those in the population who already have Internet access.

The distribution of the sample in the Web-enabled panel closely tracks the distribution of United States Census counts for the US population 18 years of age or older on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical region, employment status, income, and education. To reduce the effects of any nonresponse and non-coverage bias in panel estimates, a poststratification raking adjustment is applied using demographic distributions from the most recent data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).

The poststratification weighting variables include age, gender, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and education. This weighting adjustment is applied prior to the selection of any sample from the KnowledgePanel and represents the starting weights for any sample. The following benchmark distributions were utilized for the poststratification weighting adjustment:

- Gender (male, female)
- Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59 and 60-plus)
- Race (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, 2+ races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
- Education (less than high school, high school, some college, college degree or more)
- Household income (less than $10K, $10-25K, $25-50K, $50-75K, $75-100K, $100K-plus)
- Home ownership status (own, rent/other)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Metropolitan area (yes, no)
- Internet access (yes, no)

Primary language by Census region (non-Hispanic, Hispanic English proficient, Hispanic bilingual, Hispanic Spanish proficient)

Comparable distributions are calculated using all valid completed cases from the field data. Since study sample sizes are typically too small to accommodate a complete cross-tabulation of all the survey variables with the benchmark variables, an iterative proportional fitting is used for the poststratification weighting adjustment. This procedure adjusts the sample back to the selected benchmark proportions. Through an iterative convergence process, the weighted sample data are optimally fitted to the marginal distributions. After this final poststratification adjustment, the distribution of calculated weights is examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The post-stratified trimmed weights are then scaled to the sum of the total sample size of all eligible respondents.

In 2004 the Chicago Council Survey shifted from a mix of Internet and telephone polling to fully online polling, a shift that produces some mode differences. One difference appears to be that telephone respondents, who are talking to an interviewer, tend to give more “socially desirable” responses; they may be less likely, for example, to express approval of assassinations or torture. Another difference is that, for some questions with multiple alternatives, telephone respondents may tend to give more quick, “first choice” responses. Again, many or most Chicago Council Survey questions are unaffected by these tendencies. Still, inferences about opinion change in surveys from 2002 and prior require some caution.

For more information about the sample and survey methodology, please visit the GfK website at http://www.gfk.com/us/Solutions/consumer-panels/Pages/GfK-KnowledgePanel.aspx.

Other surveys cited in this report include the following:

**Pew Research Center**

The Spring 2014 Pew Global Survey results are drawn from nationally representative surveys in the United States (telephone interviews among 1,002 adults), China (face to face interviews with 3,190 adults), Japan (telephone interviews among 1,000 adults) and South Korea (telephone interviews among 1,009 adults). For more details, see http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/methods-in-detail-9/
Genron-NPO

The Genron NPO 2013 and 2014 surveys conducted in cooperation with The Public Opinion Research Corporation in Japan and *China Daily*, Horizon Research Consulting Group in China. The 2014 survey in Japan was fielded July 24-August 10 among 1,000 adults by the “placement (self-administered) method.” The 2014 survey in China was conducted July 14-25th in five cities, through multi-stage random sampling in Beijing, Chengdu, Shanghai, Shenyang and X’ian. The 2013 survey was conducted June 21-July 12 among 1,000 adults; the 2013 survey in China was fielded June 9-July 8 in the same five cities. For more details, see http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5153.html and http://www.genron-npo.net/english/opinionpoll_9thjc.pdf

Asan Institute

Asan Institute reports “South Korean Attitudes on the Korea-US Alliance and Northeast Asia” and “South Korean Attitudes on China” are both based on 2014 Asan Daily Poll results. These surveys were conducted by telephone by Resarch & Research with a sample size of 1,000 South Koreans over the age of 19. Results from the 2013 Asan Annual Survey are based on telephone interviews conducted by Millward Brown Media Research. Interviews took place between September 4-27 among 1,500 adult South Koreans over the age of 19. For more information, see http://en.asaninst.org/contents/centers/public-opinion-studies-center/

Committee of 100

The 2012 Committee of 100 Survey was conducted in China by Horizon Research Consultancy Group. Face to face interviews were conducted among 3,775 Chinese adults, using a multistage random sampling method, including respondents from 12 prefectural-level cities, 12 towns and 12 villages. The survey in the United States was conducted by telephone by Harris Interactive, and fielded January 4-19 among a nationally representative sample of 1,000 adults in the United States. For more information, see: http://www.survey.committee100.org/2012/EN/methodology-2-EN.php

Associated Press-GfK

The Associated Press-GfK Poll on the attitudes and opinions of Japanese was conducted by GfK Roper Public Affairs & Corporate Communications from July 29 to August 10, 2011. It is based on landline telephone interviews with a nationally representative random sample of 1,000 adults. For more information, see: http://ap-gfkpoll.com/featured/ap-gfk-poll-support-for-keeping-us-bases-in-japan-grows-as-china-nko-rea-seen-as-threats

Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR)

The survey was originally conducted by Taiwan Indicators Survey Research from March 7-9, 2014 using automated random digit dialing. In total the sample size was 1,004 residents over the age of 20 residing within the Taiwan area, including other islands under Taiwan’s jurisdiction. The aforementioned sample pool was raked for gender, county of residence, age, and level of education to be representative of the population at large. For more information, see: http://www.taiwansecurity.org/files/archive/203_7b156900.pdf
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