BRICS held its annual leaders summit last month, and it was the most newsworthy event in the bloc’s 14 years. What began as an acronym coined two decades ago by a Goldman Sachs economist to highlight emerging economies is now making a play for real global influence. Headlines are heralding a new rival to the Western-led global system.
In many ways, BRICS seems like an entity whose time has come. With the United States pushing its “us versus them” narrative of democracies versus autocracies, many states that have tired of Western rule-setting are looking to strengthen their voice and role in global politics. As America’s self-declared geopolitical counterweight, China is more than happy to lead the charge.
As long as the organizing principle of this collection of states is more about what they aren’t than what they are, BRICS’ impact will remain limited. But the United States would still do well to take a hard look at where Western-led global institutions are falling short and spurring a search for alternatives.
In 2009, Brazil, Russia, India and China — the bloc’s original four — turned an acronym into an annual summit and added South Africa to the group in 2010. It’s now set to expand again. This year, BRICS members indicated they were open to adding new members, and more than 40 countries expressed interest. Six have been invited to join: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
BRICS+ doesn’t fit into a neat geographic, governance or values category like most economic blocs. Both the original members and invitees include democracies, autocracies and countries in between. In this way, it aligns with China’s worldview in which countries can seek out external partnerships as it suits them without regard for those countries’ policies at home. This means more resources and opportunities for economic benefit, but the many disparate perspectives might make it harder for these countries to align on action.
BRICS isn’t a formal multilateral organization, and it has no governing mechanism to guide decision-making or even agree on goals. Its most concrete deliverable was establishing the New Development Bank, intended to provide an alternative source for development funding outside the Western-dominated International Monetary Fund. BRICS has otherwise proved more symbolic than substantive to date.
But that symbolism matters. The bloc isn’t overtly anti-American, but its popularity signals dissatisfaction with the Western-run global order and a desire by its members to reduce dependence on a system that hasn’t always taken the priorities of the Global South to heart. These include greater trade opportunities and more effective economic development and financial support.
Those countries that are most at odds with the United States are set to reap the greatest reward. Russia and Iran see BRICS+ as an end-run around harsh Western sanctions. While BRICS rotates leadership, China is its undeniable powerhouse, begging the question of whether countries that join BRICS+ are merely trading dominance by one great power for another.
Other countries in the group still prize close relationships with the United States. India is one of the bloc’s most significant players and will likely temper anti-American tendencies, as it has more to gain from maintaining good relations with America than it would from snubbing it.
The bloc has other inherent challenges too. The original four include one pair of frenemies (India and China), and the invitees include at least two more (Saudi Arabia and Iran; Egypt and Ethiopia). Inevitably, these states will not see eye to eye on core issues. Some are wealthy (Saudi Arabia and the UAE), while others are in dire financial straits (Argentina and Egypt).
Indeed, it’s hard to draw a common thread across these countries. The expansion, at least, seems to reflect China’s priorities. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran all bring oil, which China needs, and underscore Beijing’s expansion into the Middle East. Not a single Asian country was invited to join the BRICS expansion, suggesting China is avoiding countries concerned with its own growing reach. Argentina and Egypt are financially desperate, which could make them particularly amenable to suggestion in return for support. Ethiopia is facing major internal struggles in the aftermath of a destructive self-made war, which helped drive a wedge between Addis Ababa and its former benefactor, the United States.
China’s efforts to shape the bloc to its interests could help enhance its geopolitical clout, but viewing the BRICS expansion as a threat to the West would be a counterproductive mistake. Instead, the United States and its Western allies should take this as a learning opportunity. Why do so many Global South countries see the need to organize outside the entities of the Western-led world order? What changes would help global financial institutions better represent and meet the needs of the world’s needier countries?
By focusing on how the West can be a better global steward instead of fearing or undermining what others might offer, the West could make its own order more effective, equitable and popular too.
Elizabeth Shackelford is a senior fellow on U.S. foreign policy with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. She was previously a U.S. diplomat and is the author of “The Dissent Channel: American Diplomacy in a Dishonest Age.”
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