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Europeans Support Ukraine—To a Point

Running Numbers by Dina Smeltz , Emily Sullivan , and Zachary Leffel
Reuters
Protests in London on March 6, 2022 against the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Europeans may draw the line at military engagement with Russia, recent data show.

Desperately seeking to avoid military confrontation with Russia, European leaders have spent recent months employing diplomatic and economic tools to dissuade the Kremlin from invading Ukraine. European publics, like their leaders, recognize the seriousness of the threat to Ukraine, but are wary of taking steps that would lead to direct military confrontation with Russia.

The most recent sanctions announced by the EU target Russian oligarchs and businessmen in the oil, banking, and finance sectors, as well as members of the government and military. The EU has signaled that these sanctions are only the beginning of the economic penalties they are willing to inflict on Russia if the invasion continues.

Even Germany, a country that has been notably averse to military engagement in recent decades, has taken dramatic steps to respond to the invasion of Ukraine. Just after Putin ordered the military to cross into Ukraine, German chancellor Olaf Scholz suspended the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline connecting the two countries. Going even further, Scholz announced that Germany would reverse its current policy of not shipping weapons to war zones and begin arming the Ukrainian army. He also unveiled plans to invest significantly in modernizing and increasing Germany’s own defense capabilities. A recent Forsa poll conducted for the German broadcaster n-tv finds that 78 percent of the German public supports both of these newly announced policies, indicating a keen awareness among Germans of the threat that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine poses to European security.

European Publics Divided on Risking Military Conflict with Russia...

This preference among European leaders for diplomacy and economic incentives, and reluctance to commit to military defense of Ukraine, appears to be largely in line with public opinion in the region.

A January 2022 poll by Schoen Cooperman Research finds that Western publics feel a sense of affinity and shared identity with Ukraine. Pluralities or majorities in France (52%), Germany (52%), Poland (45%), and the United Kingdom (41%) believe that Ukraine is democratic and shares values with the West. Many in Europe also recognize Ukraine’s right to be free of Russian influence. A January 20-21 Morning Consult poll conducted online finds that majorities in Germany (63%) and the United Kingdom (58%), and a plurality in France (37%), believe that Russia should have no influence or not much influence in countries like Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

That being said, this sense of shared values is complicated by proximity to the invasion and for the possibility that it could bleed into a significant conflict for their country with Russia. Fewer than two in 10 in France, Germany, Poland, the United States, United Kingdom, or Canada believe that, when it comes to their own country’s interests, improving relations with Russia is more important than defending Ukraine.

Combined majorities feel it is more important to defend Ukraine than improve ties with Russia, but only up to a point. A plurality in France (46%), and majorities in Germany (51%) and Poland (52%) say “defending Ukraine would be good, it is not worth the risk of serious conflict with Russia.” An additional 19 percent in France, 16 percent in Germany, and 15 percent in Poland say defending Ukraine is more important than improving relations with Russia.

Publics that are more removed from the conflict, including those in the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada, are somewhat more willing to prioritize defending Ukraine over improving relations with Russia, but they are fairly divided on whether doing so would be worth the risk of conflict with Moscow. In each country, there is also a sizeable portion of the public that refused or declined to answer the question.

Aversion to military action does not necessarily mean that European publics plan to let Russia invade Ukraine with no consequences. The January Morning Consult data shows that bare majorities in Germany and the United Kingdom (51% each) would support the imposition of sanctions on Russia by the West if Russia were to invade Ukraine. The French public was more divided, with 42 percent supporting sanctions, 17 percent opposing them, and 40 percent saying they don’t know.

...But Are Willing to Accept Some Other Consequences

A January 2022 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) poll conducted in seven European countries (Poland, Sweden, Romania, Italy, Germany, Finland, France) finds that, European publics are generally willing to bear a number of potential consequences in order to help Ukraine.

When looking at aggregate results across the seven countries surveyed, more people than not think that the potential for refugees from Ukraine (46% risk worth taking), higher energy prices (44%), cyberattacks (43%), and economic downturn (42%) are worth risking in order to help Ukraine. They are closely divided between 42 percent who think the threat of Russian military action is a risk not worth taking and 39 percent who think it is worth taking.

However, there is significant variation between European countries when it comes to the price publics are willing to pay to defend Ukraine. For example, by a margin of at least nine points on each item, the French public is not willing to risk any of these potential consequences in order to defend Ukraine. Similarly, the Finnish public is willing to risk only cyberattacks (+4 point margin worth the risk), and the German public would risk only the potential consequence of refugees from Ukraine (+5 margin).

The Unique Case of Poland

Poland sits very close to Ukraine geographically, has received the greatest number of refugees, and, in terms of public opinion, it is at the opposite end of the spectrum from France. Poles are much more likely than other European publics to consider a potential economic downturn, higher energy prices, refugees from Ukraine, cyberattacks, and the threat of Russian invasion all as worth risking to come to Ukraine’s aid. This is likely because the Polish public feels more threatened by Russia’s stance on Ukraine than do the other publics included in the ECFR survey, given the country’s history as a former Soviet satellite state. At least seven in 10 Poles see Russia’s position on Ukraine as a large threat to their country in the areas of migration (77%), energy dependence (77%), cyber-warfare (73%), military action (77%), and the economy (73%). The current situation in Ukraine may also dent the confidence of Poles in their own security; the Public Opinion Research Center’s December 2021 survey finds Polish confidence in NATO’s defense commitments at a record low. Just under half of Poles (49%) agree that Poland can be sure of NATO allies’ commitment to defend Poland’s borders if needed.

Conclusion

At this point in the conflict, European leaders and the publics that they represent seem to largely be in agreement: Ukraine is a democratic country that shares values with the rest and has the right to remain free of Russian influence and control. While European publics stand ready to impose sanctions on Russia, accept refugees, and aid Ukraine in other ways, it is not clear that military engagement with Russia is a line they are currently prepared to cross.

About the Authors
Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
Headshot for Dina Smeltz
Dina Smeltz, a polling expert, has more than 25 years of experience designing and fielding international social and political surveys. Prior to joining the Council to lead its annual survey of American attitudes on US foreign policy, she served in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the US State Department's Office of Research from 1992 to 2008.
Headshot for Dina Smeltz
Emily Sullivan
Former Research Assistant, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
Headshot for Emily Sullivan
Emily Sullivan joined the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2021 and was a research assistant on the Public Opinion team.
Headshot for Emily Sullivan
Zachary Leffel
Former Intern
Zachary joined the Council in January 2022 and is formerly an intern with the public opinion team. He's a student at the University of Chicago studying political science and data science.