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South Koreans See Improved Security, Confident in US Security Guarantee

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
Over the past 12 months, there have been more discussions between South Korean, US, and North Korean officials about Pyongyang's potential denuclearization than at any time since the Six-Party Talks in 2006 and 2007. Exactly where those discussions are headed is unclear. But in South Korea, the public generally sees an improvement in the South Korean security situation according to a just-completed Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey. As a result, support for South Korea developing its own nuclear weapon appears to have waned, though a slight majority remains in favor. Despite what seems to be a slight sense of relief, the South Korean public is skeptical that either Moon or Trump can convince Kim Jong Un to fully denuclearize.

Key Findings:

- A plurality of South Koreans (42%) say that their country's national security situation has improved compared to four years ago.
- A majority of South Koreans (57%) say President Moon had a greater influence on North Korea's decision to hold denuclearization talks than did President Trump (31%).
- But slim majorities have little or no confidence that either President Moon's (52%) or President Trump's (53%) negotiating abilities will result in the denuclearization of North Korea.
- The US-South Korea alliance (36%) and US forces in Korea (20%) are the two most highly-cited factors in preventing a wide scale North Korean attack.
- A narrow majority (54%) favor South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons, down from similar readings in recent years.

Plurality See Improvement in South Korean Security Situation

In August 2017, many around the world held their breath as Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un traded ominous barbs, including the now infamous "Fire and Fury" tweet. In the meantime, South Korean President Moon Jae-in laid the groundwork to pursue increased interactions with Pyongyang. Kim Jong Un's 2018 New Year speech provided an opening, and President Moon eventually facilitated a meeting between Trump and the North Korean leader. The series of summits appear to have assuaged South Korean public concerns. According to the results of a December 26-27 Chicago Council survey, a plurality of South Koreans say that their country's national security situation has improved over the past four years (42%), three in ten (30%) believe the security situation has remained the same, and 23 percent say it has worsened.



However, there are significant partisan divides. A majority of those who identify as supporters of the Democratic Party (DP)—the party of President of Moon—say the security situation has improved (66%) versus 13 percent of supporters of the opposition Liberty Korea Party (LKP). Partisan divides on this issue are to be expected, but it is worth noting that there may be broader agreement on North Korea policy overall under the Moon administration. In a March 2018 poll conducted by the Asan Institute, 60 percent stated satisfaction with Moon's policy towards the North.¹

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¹ "South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2018", The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, March 2018. By comparison, in 2014 only 42% approved of the Park administration's North Korea policy.

From Confrontation to Negotiation

The speed of rapprochement, from a potential confrontation in late 2017 to a series of summits in 2018, left many analysts debating whether Moon Jae-in or Donald Trump deserved credit for the turnaround. While a July 2018 Asan poll found that South Koreans rated Trump the most likeable leader included in the survey (5.2),² they assign most of the credit to Moon Jae-in. Six in ten say his outreach has had a greater impact on the current talks about denuclearizing North Korea (57%) compared to just three in ten who believe Trump has had more influence (31%).³

South Koreans Skeptical about North Korea Denuclearization

Despite a plurality seeing an improvement in South Korea's security, the South Korean public is skeptical that Pyongyang will ever give up its nuclear weapons program, according to a March 2018 Korean Gallup poll (64%).⁴ Accordingly, there is similar skepticism in the abilities of either Moon (52% lack confidence) or Trump (53% lack confidence) to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.⁵ Even if either leader could convince North Korea to denuclearize, the public has ambiguous expectations of just how long denuclearization will take. A June 2018 East Asia Institute poll shows that 46 percent said denuclearization would take a long time.⁶ Similarly, the March 2018 Asan poll found that among those that thought North Korea would denuclearize—24 percent said North Korea would not denuclearize—18 percent said it would take between 6 and 10 years.⁷

Three-quarters (76%) of the South Korean public views international sanctions against North Korea to be a positive factor in attempts to pressure North Korea to denuclearize. This result is largely consistent across age cohorts, political party affiliation, and ideological outlook.

Koreans See US-ROK Alliance as the Key Deterrent to North Korean Attack in Past Decade

The rhetoric emanating from North Korea often comes with threats of violence, and at times, there have been limited attacks against South Korea. But there has not been a larger-scale invasion. South Koreans attribute the relationship with the United States as the main factor in preventing a wide scale North Korean attack in the past

² Kim Ji-eun, "South Korean public opinion on Kim Jong-un and Trump more favorable after Singapore summit," *Hankyoreh*, July 9, 2018.

³ Five percent of respondents said both leaders are equally responsible and 8 percent say neither was responsible.


⁴ Gallup Korea Daily Opinion No. 298, March 13-15, 2018. This was down from 90 percent in January 2018.

 $^{^{5}}$ Just under half are at least somewhat confident in Moon (45%) or Trump (44%).

⁶ "The 6th South Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll (2018)", The Genron NPO & East Asia Institute, June 18, 2018.

⁷ "South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2018", The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, March 2018. A plurality (24%) said North Korea would not denuclearize.

10 years. The US-South Korea alliance (36%) and US forces stationed in Korea (20%) are the most often cited reasons in the survey. Results for both of these items are highly consistent across age groups. A further 7 percent say that the key to preventing an attack has been the US nuclear umbrella.



The South Korean public not only considers the US-South Korea alliance an effective bulwark against a North Korean attack, they are also confident in the US security guarantee. Fully 75 percent of the South Korean public is very (30%) or somewhat (45%) confident that the United States would defend South Korea if North Korea attacked. This corresponds with a Pew Spring 2017 survey in which an even higher percentage of South Koreans (91%) believed that if South Korea got into a serious military conflict with North Korea, the United States would use military force to defend their country.⁸

Even if North Korea agrees to abandon its nuclear program, six in ten Koreans believe that South Korea will need to continue military exercises with the United States (60%). But there is less consensus on whether they would need to remain under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella (51% no, 45% yes). Survey data from the East Asia Institute show that the Korean public is also closely divided on whether

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⁸ Kristen Bialik, "5 facts about how the US and its allies see North Korea," Pew Research Center, June 11, 2018.

US Forces Korea would still be necessary after "peace and unification occur" (50% yes, 45% no).

Waning Support for a Nuclear South Korea

Once taboo, discussion of a South Korean domestic nuclear weapons program has become an issue now more openly discussed. As in past polls conducted in the country, a slight majority of the Korean public believe that South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons (54% yes, 43% no). Compared to a similarly-worded question asked in previous Asan polls, this support has dropped since 2011-2013 surveys when two-thirds of Koreans approved of obtaining their own nuclear weapons.⁹

This shift is also apparent in East Asia Institute trends. In their 2018 poll, the East Asia Institute found that 43 percent of South Koreans would support South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons program if North Korea does not agree to give ups its nuclear weapons, down from 67 percent in 2017.¹⁰ The public seems to acknowledge the risks of a domestic South Korean nuclear program. While majorities see clear benefits in reducing South Korea's dependence on the US (61%), in allowing South Korea to respond to a North Korean threat (57%), and in terms of increasing its regional power (53%) if it were to pursue nuclear weapons, these advantages are outweighed by potential hazards. Even larger majorities are convinced that obtaining these weapons would trigger an arms race in the region (69%), especially with Japan (79%), and would also precipitate economic hardship for South Korea due to likely international sanctions (67%).


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⁹ Kim Jiyoon, Karl Friedhoff, and Kang Chungku, "The Fallout: South Korean Public Opinion Following North Korea's Third Nuclear Test," The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, February 25, 2013.

¹⁰ "The 6th South Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll (2018)", The Genron NPO & East Asia Institute, June 18, 2018.



If South Korea were to develop its own nuclear weapons program, would you agree/disagree with the following statements: South Korea developing nuclear weapons would... (% Strongly/somewhat agree)



About the Survey

This survey was conducted in South Korea from December 26–27, 2018 by Hankook Research. The sample size was 1,000 aged 19 and older and it employed RDD for mobile and landline phones. The margin of error is $\pm 3.1\%$ at the 95% confidence level.

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Appendix

Q1: Compared to 4 years ago, do you think that South Korea's national security situation has gotten better, gotten worse or remained the same?

2018	Gotten better (%)	Remained the same (%)	Gotten worse (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	42	30	23	5
Age: 19-29	35	41	18	6
30-39	49	36	14	1
40-49	54	26	18	2
50-59	44	26	26	5
60+	33	24	34	8
Ideological inclination: Progressive	68	23	7	3
Mid-roader	40	33	21	6
Conservative	22	32	43	4
Don't know/no answer	41	32	23	5
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	66	26	4	4
The Liberty Korea Party	13	25	57	5
The Bareunmirae Party	33	33	28	5
The Party for Democracy and Peace	44	33	22	0
The Justice Party	64	25	10	2
Other Party	20	20	60	0
None/don't know/no answer	22	39	32	7

Q2: In your view, which has had greater impact on North Korea's ability to hold talks on denuclearization? President Moon's outreach to Kim Jong Un or US President Trump's outreach to Kim Jong Un?

2018		Moon (%)	Trump (%)	Both equally (%)	Neither (%)
<u>Overall</u>		57	31	5	8
Age:	19-29	48	40	5	7
	30-39	66	28	3	3
	40-49	68	27	2	4
	50-59	58	33	2	8

60+	48	28	10	14
Ideological inclination: Progressive	79	16	3	2
Mid-roader	58	29	4	9
Conservative	33	51	6	10
Don't know/no answer	53	23	13	13
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	86	11	2	1
The Liberty Korea Party	20	60	7	13
The Bareunmirae Party	39	49	7	5
The Party for Democracy and Peace	67	33	0	0
The Justice Party	72	20	3	4
Other Party	50	40	0	10
None/don't know/no answer	39	38	8	16

Q3: How confident are you in President Moon's abilities to negotiate with Kim Jong Un will lead to the complete denuclearization of North Korea?

2018	Very confident (%)	Somewhat confident (%)	Not very confident (%)	Not confident at all (%)	No answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	13	32	32	20	3
Age: 19-29	7	37	37	15	5
30-39	16	44	25	15	1
40-49	22	36	24	16	2
50-59	14	29	32	24	1
60+	9	21	38	27	5
Ideological inclination: Progressive	27	43	22	6	2
Mid-roader	10	34	35	19	3
Conservative	5	17	38	39	1
Don't know/no answer	10	34	29	14	13
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	27	47	20	4	2
The Liberty Korea Party	2	6	40	50	1
The Bareunmirae Party	3	27	47	24	0
The Party for Democracy and Peace	11	42	32	16	0
The Justice Party	14	46	32	8	1
Other Party	0	30	10	60	. O

					
None/don't know/no	5	22	40	28	6
answer	3	22	40	20	O

Q4: How confident are you in US President Donald Trump's abilities to negotiate with Kim Jong Un will lead to the complete denuclearization of North Korea?

2018	Very confident (%)	Somewhat confident (%)	Not very confident (%)	Not confident at all (%)	No answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	10	34	39	14	4
Age: 19-29	5	34	41	14	5
30-39	9 13	40	33	13	1
40-49	9 14	33	39	13	2
50-59	9 13	34	38	12	2
60 [.]	+ 5	29	41	16	9
Ideological inclination Progressive		45	33	8	2
Mid-roade	r 10	32	41	13	4
Conservativ	e 9	26	43	18	3
Don't know/no answe	r 4	29	34	19	14
Supportive party: The Democratic Party		40	36	8	2
The Liberty Kore Part		25	37	22	5
The Bareunmira Part	y 8	31	48	11	3
The Party fo Democracy and Peac		22	56	6	6
The Justice Part	у 6	40	39	14	2
Other Part		11	44	22	0
None/don't know/n answe	~	30	40	17	7

Q5: In your opinion, which of the following items contributed the most to preventing a wide scale North Korean attack on South Korea in the Past 10 years?

2018	The US- ROK alliance in general (%)	The US forces stationed in Korea (%)	The possibility that such an attack could lead to the overthrow of the Kim regime (%)	The US nuclear umbrella (%)	China's influence on North Korea (%)	Lack of technical capability (%)	North Korean leadership 's restraint (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	36	20	8	7	6	6	6	10

Age: 19-29	39	18	8	5	5	10	6	9
30-3	9 32	20	10	4	11	8	6	10
40-4	9 36	20	10	9	5	7	10	5
50-5	9 39	20	6	7	6	7	6	9
60	+ 36	21	6	11	6	2	3	16
Ideological inclination: Progressiv	38 e	14	12	5	8	7	9	8
Mid-roade	er 37	19	8	8	5	8	6	10
Conservativ	e 39	28	6	9	6	4	4	4
Don know/n answe	o 23	17	0	10	6	4	2	37
Supportive party: Th Democrati Part	С	14	11	7	7	7	7	8
The Libert Korea Part	y 41	30	2	10	5	2	2	7
Th Bareunmira Part	е 30 У	17	13	12	7	7	11	4
The Party fo Democrac and Peac	y 44	22	6	6	0	11	6	6
The Justic Part		19	10	4	7	11	10	8
Other Part	-	40	0	10	0	0	0	10
None/don know/n answe	0 35	21	4	6	7	5	5	17

Q6: If North Korea were to attack South Korea, how confident are you that the United States would defend South Korea?

2018		Very confident (%)	Somewhat confident (%)	Not very confident (%)	Not confident at all (%)	Don't know (%)
<u>Overall</u>		30	45	20	3	2
Age:	19-29	24	44	23	6	3
	30-39	30	44	23	2	1
	40-49	32	46	20	3	0
	50-59	29	48	17	5	2
	60+	33	44	17	2	3

Ideological inclination: Progressive	35	43	18	2	1
Mid-roader	26	46	20	5	2
Conservative	31	47	19	3	1
Don't know/no answer	29	36	26	1	8
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	33	43	20	2	2
The Liberty Korea Party	38	42	15	2	2
The Bareunmirae Party	36	45	17	1	1
The Party for Democracy and Peace	26	53	5	11	5
The Justice Party	24	42	28	5	0
Other Party	50	10	40	0	0
None/don't know/no answer	21	52	19	6	3

Q7: If the North Korean nuclear threat disappears, will South Korea still need to be protected by the US nuclear umbrella?

2018	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	45	51	5
Age: 19-	29 47	50	3
30-	-39 48	50	2
40-	49 46	51	3
50-	-59 37	59	4
6	0+ 46	45	9
Ideological inclination		58	4
Mid-roa	der 42	53	5
Conservat	ive 54	43	3
Don't know/no ansv	ver 45	45	10
Supportive party: The Democratic Pa		57	3
	rty	37	4
	rty	49	1
The Party Democracy and Pea		67	6
The Justice Pa		61	2
Other Pa		30	10
None/don't know, ansv	40	47	8

Q8: If the North Korean nuclear threat disappears, will South Korea Still need to continue conducting joint military exercises with the United States?

_2018	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	60	38	2
Age: 19-29	70	28	2
30-39	63	36	1
40-49	53	46	2
50-59	52	46	2
60+	61	35	4
Ideological inclination: Progressive	49	49	2
Mid-roader	58	41	1
Conservative	74	25	1
Don't know/no answer	56	31	13
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	51	46	2
The Liberty Korea Party	69	28	3
The Bareunmirae Party	75	25	0
The Party for Democracy and Peace	56	39	6
The Justice Party	49	51	0
Other Party	80	20	0
None/don't know/no answer	65	31	4

Q9: Should South Korea develop its own nuclear weapons?

2018		Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>		54	43	3
Age:	19-29	40	59	2
	30-39	52	48	1
	40-49	50	49	1
	50-59	65	31	5
	60+	60	35	5

Ideological inclination: Progressive	48	50	2
Mid-roader	54	43	3
Conservative	59	39	2
Do <u>n't</u> know/no answer	56	36	8
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	44	53	3
The Liberty Korea Party	66	31	3
The Bareunmirae Party	61	39	0
The Party for Democracy and Peace	56	44	0
The Justice Party	51	48	1
Other Party	60	40	0
None/don't know/no answer	58	37	5

Q10: If South Korea were to develop its own nuclear weapons program, would you agree/disagree with the following statements:

10/1. South Korea developing nuclear weapons would allow it to respond to any future potential threats from North Korea

2018	Strongly agree (%)	Somewhat agree (%)	Somewhat disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	26	31	26	14	4
Age: 19-29	12	29	40	17	2
30-39	16	37	31	15	1
40-49	22	28	27	20	3
50-59	30	34	22	12	3
60+	40	28	15	9	8
Ideological inclination: Progressive	19	28	29	22	2
Mid-roader	24	36	25	12	3
Conservative	33	28	25	11	3
Don't know/no answer	29	29	21	10	11
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	20	31	29	17	3
The Liberty Korea Party	45	26	15	9	5
The Bareunmirae Party	16	44	23	16	1
The Party for Democracy and Peace	28	11	22	22	17
The Justice Party	19	24	35	20	2

Other Party	30	40	10	22	0
None/don't know/no		35	25	9	5
answer				ŭ	•

10/2. South Korea developing nuclear weapons would elevate its position as a regional power

2018	Strongly agree (%)	Somewhat agree (%)	Somewhat disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	23	30	29	16	3
Age: 19-29	12	32	37	18	1
30-39	18	31	31	20	0
40-49	21	24	28	24	2
50-59	25	35	28	11	2
60+	34	29	22	9	7
Ideological inclination: Progressive	19	30	28	21	2
Mid-roader	22	30	30	15	2
Conservative	26	32	27	13	1
Don't know/no answer	28	22	26	16	3
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	22	29	29	18	2
The Liberty Korea Party	40	26	21	9	4
The Bareunmirae Party	22	27	35	16	0
The Party for Democracy and Peace	21	26	26	21	5
The Justice Party	14	35	30	21	0
Other Party	10	50	10	30	0
None/don't know/no answer	20	32	30	13	5

10/3. South Korea developing nuclear weapons would reduce the Republic of Korea's dependence on the United States for its defense

2018		Strongly agree (%)	Somewhat agree (%)	Somewhat disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>		26	35	24	12	3
Age:	19-29	19	33	34	12	2
	30-39	22	33	26	18	0
	40-49	27	36	17	19	1

50-59	31	37	22	6	3
60+	28	35	22	7	8
Ideological inclination: Progressive	47	35	12	3	3
Mid-roader	40	38	14	5	4
Conservative	49	35	11	2	3
Don't know/no answer	34	24	11	6	25
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	29	35	20	14	2
The Liberty Korea Party	29	37	22	9	2
The Bareunmirae Party	24	35	29	11	1
The Party for Democracy and Peace	21	32	32	11	5
The Justice Party	25	35	23	17	0
Other Party	20	50	10	20	0
None/don't know/no answer	22	34	29	9	7

10/4. South Korea developing nuclear weapons would create the possibility that Japan would also get a nuclear weapon

2018	Strongly agree (%)	Somewhat agree (%)	Somewhat disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	44	35	12	3	5
Age: 19-29	28	44	18	8	2
30-39	42	37	16	2	3
40-49	51	35	10	3	2
50-59	48	37	9	3	5
60+	47	27	11	3	12
Ideological inclination: Progressive	47	35	12	3	3
Mid-roader	40	38	14	4	4
Conservative	49	35	11	2	3
Don't know/no answer	34	24	11	6	25
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	44	35	13	4	4
The Liberty Korea Party	50	33	8	3	6
The Bareunmirae Party	51	34	9	1	4
The Party for Democracy and Peace	32	37	21	5	5
The Justice Party	51	33	12	2	. 1

Other Party	60	30	10	Ο	0
None/don't know/no answer	33	38	14	5	10

10/5. South Korea developing nuclear weapons would trigger an arms race in the region

2018	Strongly agree (%)	Somewhat agree (%)	Somewhat disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	33	36	17	5	9
Age: 19-29	23	46	22	6	3
30-39	31	35	20	10	4
40-49	45	31	16	4	5
50-59	36	34	17	4	10
60+	31	35	12	3	19
Ideological inclination: Progressive	37	38	16	5	5
Mid-roader	30	41	17	6	7
Conservative	38	30	17	6	9
Don't know/no answer	23	24	15	3	35
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	35	38	14	5	7
The Liberty Korea Party	44	27	13	4	12
The Bareunmirae Party	35	37	20	3	5
The Party for Democracy and Peace	17	50	11	11	11
The Justice Party	37	33	21	5	3
Other Party	60	40	0	0	0
None/don't know/no answer	22	37	20	7	15

10/6. South Korea developing nuclear weapons would result in economic hardship due to likely international sanctions

2018		Strongly agree (%)	Somewhat agree (%)	Somewhat disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>		31	37	21	8	4
Age:	19-29	34	35	19	9	3
	30-39	29	38	24	7	2

40-49	35	42	15	6	2
50-59	33	36	21	7	4
60+	26	33	21	8	4
Ideological inclination: Progressive	35	32	22	8	3
Mid-roader	28	39	21	8	4
Conservative	30	39	19	9	3
Don't know/no answer	30	30	18	4	18
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	33	33	23	7	4
The Liberty Korea Party	30	34	21	10	5
The Bareunmirae Party	40	36	16	7	1
The Party for Democracy and Peace	20	40	25	5	15
The Justice Party	35	44	15	10	1
Other Party	30	20	40	9	0
None/don't know/no answer	25	40	21	7	6

10/7. South Korea developing nuclear weapons would increase the chances of miscalculation or a dispute with North Korea escalating to a nuclear exchange

2018	Strongly agree (%)	Somewhat agree (%)	Somewhat disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	27	26	28	14	5
Age: 19-29	33	37	19	9	2
30-39	28	27	28	17	0
40-49	32	22	27	16	3
50-59	20	27	35	16	4
60+	24	26	28	14	5
Ideological inclination: Progressive	31	25	28	14	2
Mid-roader	27	30	27	12	5
Conservative	25	23	30	20	3
Don't know/no answer	24	20	23	9	25
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	31	27	28	12	3
The Liberty Korea Party	24	21	29	21	4
The Bareunmirae Party	24	26	34	13	3
The Party for Democracy and Peace	17	28	39	11	6

The Justice Party	30	25	25	19	1
Other Party	20	50	20	10	0
None/don't know/no answer	24	28	25	12	11

Q11. What influence do you think the international sanctions on North Korea are having on North Korea's complete denuclearization?

2018	Very positive (%)	Somewhat positive (%)	Somewhat negative (%)	Very negative (%)	Don't know/no answer (%)
<u>Overall</u>	25	51	16	3	4
Age: 19-29	15	55	25	1	3
30-39	21	56	20	2	1
40-49	23	56	15	4	2
50-59	33	50	11	4	3
60+	28	43	13	5	11
Ideological inclination: Progressive	22	52	20	3	3
Mid-roader	23	53	16	4	3
Conservative	31	49	15	3	2
Don't know/no answer	15	44	10	4	27
Supportive party: The Democratic Party	25	53	16	3	2
The Liberty Korea Party	37	37	15	5	6
The Bareunmirae Party	33	52	13	1	0
The Party for Democracy and Peace	6	61	28	0	6
The Justice Party	15	61	18	4	2
Other Party	40	60	0	0	0
None/don't know/no answer	18	51	17	4	9