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European Public Opinion & Foreign Policy

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

An Emerging European View of the World?

This report, “European Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” is a part of a larger “Worldviews 2002” survey on U.S. and European foreign policy attitudes undertaken by The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) and the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). For the past 28 years, CCFR has conducted a quadrennial public opinion survey in the United States on American public and leadership attitudes about international relations and foreign policy issues. In 2002, for the first time, CCFR partnered with GMF to undertake a parallel study in six European countries—Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland.

The CCFR quadrennial survey has become the most comprehensive and widely cited source of information on American attitudes towards foreign policy. The German Marshall Fund hopes that the new European companion survey will be as comprehensive and authoritative a guide to European attitudes. While a few other European foreign policy surveys—in particular the European Union’s Eurobarometer surveys—match or exceed this survey’s large sample size of 6,000 Europeans in six countries, the CCFR/GMF survey is distinctive in its depth of coverage. The survey explores European attitudes towards other countries and towards

European and international institutions as well as the values and motivations that underlie European views of the world. Moreover, because it asks many of the same questions as the CCFR survey, the survey allows for comparison across the Atlantic.

This report, prepared by GMF, presents and analyzes the European survey data. A companion report prepared by CCFR, entitled “American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” analyzes the U.S. data. A third report, “Comparing American and European Public Opinion on Foreign Policy,” prepared by a joint CCFR-GMF team, looks at the comparisons between the U.S. and European results.

The timing of this survey is auspicious for a number of reasons. One year after the events of September 11, 2001, theories abound as to how Europeans now view the world and Europe’s place in it. Are Europeans concerned about the threat of terrorism, or have the attacks on Washington and New York left their views largely unchanged? Is anti-Americanism on the rise in Europe? Are the United States and Europe drifting apart? Do Europeans, in fact, wish to chart a path independent from that of the United States? As Europeans construct a common European foreign and security policy, do they really want the European Union to be a

player on the world scene? If so, what kind of foreign policy do they want it to pursue? The survey provides some data with which to address these questions.

THE EUROPEAN STORY

The European report that follows tells an intriguing story of how Europeans view the world around them one year after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington—who they see as friends and allies, the threats they perceive, their attitudes about the use of force, and the importance they attach to international institutions. The report finds an emerging European consensus on a broad range of foreign policy questions. Europeans tend to regard the same countries as friends and enemies, view the distribution of power and influence in the world in broadly similar terms, see the same set of threats impinging upon their security, and favor employing the same sets of tools to combat these threats.

Most strikingly, most Europeans want the European Union to become a superpower like the United States—not in order to better compete with that country, but to better cooperate with it. Contrary to recent press reports of rising anti-Americanism in Europe, Europeans express very warm feelings towards the United States—as warm as those for their European neighbors. At the same time, they are sharply critical of certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy and want to see Europe play a greater role in world affairs.

The role they see for this European superpower is different from that played by the United States. From the survey responses, one detects a distinct strategic sensibility emerging in Europe, one that favors economic and political tools over military ones, multilateral approaches over unilateral ones, and humanitarian missions over ones launched solely out of national interest, even though Europeans do not rule out the use of any tools in their strategic toolbox. When necessary, Europeans express a willingness to use force in a broad range of circumstances.

Within this emerging European consensus, however, there are important differences. There are strong

pacifist strains to be found in Germany and the Netherlands, perhaps because of the former's tragic role in World War II and the latter's more recent association with the massacre at Srebrenica. A significant minority of Europeans, especially in Great Britain, Germany, and Poland, have warmer feelings toward the United States than toward the European Union and see it as more important to their country's vital interests. On the other hand, there are others, particularly in France, who are wary of U.S. leadership in world affairs. Consequently, alongside the view that Europe should become a superpower working with the United States to ensure global stability, one finds other important minority viewpoints: Europeans who would prefer that the United States remain the only superpower and that Europe confine itself strictly to a regional role or no foreign policy role at all, and Europeans who would like Europe to become a superpower so as to compete more effectively with the United States.

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

At the time this survey was conducted in June and July of 2002, the events of September 11, 2001, continued to dominate the way in which the United States viewed the world and the way in which the world viewed it. America was at war, and despite a successful military operation in Afghanistan, the war against terrorism was just beginning. President Bush, with overwhelming public support, spent much of the first half of 2002 introducing new initiatives aimed at fighting and preventing terrorism, including tighter immigration laws, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, and a strategy of preemptive strikes against those suspected of manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. In spite of such efforts, future attacks on American targets were described as “inevitable” by the U.S. administration, and Osama bin Laden remained at large.

For the rest of the globe, America's war on terrorism was bringing a mix of new opportunities, concerns, or threats, depending on the country. For some countries, such as Russia, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan, the post-September 11 era brought interna-

tional assistance, treaties, partnerships, and world recognition. For Europe the war brought concern about U.S. unilateralism, the possible disregard for human rights, and unmatched U.S. military, political, and economic might. For Iraq, the months following September 11 brought the threat of attack, which at the time of this writing appeared imminent.

The war against terrorism shared the front pages of world papers with the conflict in the Middle East, where violence soared to new heights. Palestinian suicide bombers launched several attacks in Israeli cities, prompting an Israeli invasion of several West Bank towns, including Ramallah, the site of Yasir Arafat's administrative headquarters. President Bush, in his framework for peace in the region, outlined his vision of a "provisional" Palestinian state, conditioned upon the election of a new leadership.

India and Pakistan drew international attention in the spring of 2002 with their saber rattling over Kashmir. While the likelihood of an all-out war, potentially including nuclear weapons, eventually subsided, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf were far from resolving their differences and hundreds of thousands of troops remained mobilized on the border between the two countries.

On the economic front, the world economy was in a downturn, dragged down by a sluggish U.S. economy. Just as the United States seemed to be pulling itself out of recession, a series of corporate scandals pummeled the stock market. Trade issues returned to the headlines when President Bush slapped tariffs on steel imports and increased farm subsidies, to the dismay of Europe and many other parts of the globe.

A financial crisis ripped through Argentina, sending waves of panic through Latin America and other emerging markets.

THE MOOD IN EUROPE

At the time this study was undertaken, European frustration with immigration, rising crime and unemployment, and the perceived inability of established politi-

cians to address these problems produced stunning electoral advances for several far right-wing candidates such as Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and the late Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands. The more general shift in the political landscape from left to right across the continent seemed like it might continue into the fall elections in Germany, as Bavarian conservative Edmund Stoiber mounted a serious challenge to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the polls.

In Brussels, the European Union launched a constitutional convention in February 2002, chaired by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, with the aim of drafting a constitution for Europe. Among the items on the agenda was the EU's inability to speak and negotiate as one in the area of foreign policy.

The EU's rapid-reaction force was scheduled to make its debut in September 2002 by taking over peace-keeping duties in Macedonia from NATO. But Greece and Turkey remained deadlocked on the question of whether or how the EU could use NATO assets.

Despite the uneventful EU Seville Summit, where the EU failed to agree on farm policy for new members, the 10 candidate countries were promised that their negotiations with the EU would still finish at the end of 2002.

NATO was preparing for its fall summit in Prague, where a number of candidates would be invited to join the alliance. Unlike the first round of enlargement, the debates surrounding this second round were relatively subdued and overshadowed by the broader question of NATO's role in the post-September 11 environment.

Rather than opposing enlargement, Russian President Vladimir Putin had seized upon the new strategic environment to align Russia more closely to the West. A new NATO-Russia Council was formed in May 2002 and Russia acquired an official seat at the G-8 table.

On the economic front, 12 members of the European Union traded in their national currencies for the euro on January 1, 2002. Contrary to predictions, the transition went very smoothly except for some unwarranted consumer price hikes. And in the summer of 2002, the dollar hit a 28-month low against the euro.

In another demonstration of its increasing clout in the world economy, the EU blocked a handful of U.S. mergers, including that of General Electric and Honeywell.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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GMF is also grateful to The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and its President Marshall M. Bouton for inviting us to partner with them in this joint venture. Their 28 years of experience in conducting the American survey proved invaluable in a multitude of ways throughout this project. Christopher Whitney of the CCFR ably coordinated the logistical aspects of this joint undertaking, and Catherine Hug did a masterful job of editing and laying out the three final reports.

The survey team would like to acknowledge as well the assistance of a number of GMF colleagues. Special thanks to Craig Kennedy, president of the German Marshall Fund, for his unwavering support and guidance throughout the project. Thanks as well to Karen Donfried, Phillip Henderson, Bill Drozdiak, Heike MacKerron, Alessandra Nervi, John Harris, Ron Asmus, Amaya Bloch-Laine, Ellen Pope, and Arnout Brouwers for their invaluable advice and assistance. Adam Hunter, Myles Nienstadt, Claudia Chantal Zackariya, Bridget Bodane, Abigail Golden-Vazquez, Ryan van Wijk, Pat Griffin, Susan Corke, and Anna Matussek all played important roles in the dissemination of the report. We would also like to recognize Lomangino Studios and Hug Communications for their contributions to the design and production of the final report.

Finally, we would like to express our appreciation to the survey research firm MORI (Market & Opinion Research International), and especially Andy Martin and Lisa Grace, for their cooperation while working under a tight schedule.

The data from this survey will be placed on deposit with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, the Roper Center for Public Opinion in Storrs, Connecticut, and NORC (National Opinion Research Center) at the University of Chicago. It will be available to scholars and other interested professionals. This report will also be available on the Internet at www.worldviews.org.



S U M M A R Y

The Findings in Summary

The “Worldviews 2002” survey of public attitudes in six European countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland) reveals striking commonalities in how Europeans view the world and Europe’s role in it.

AN INWARDLY FOCUSED CONTINENT

- Even in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, Europeans are far more preoccupied with domestic issues than with international ones. When asked to describe the most important issue confronting their country, only about 1 in 10 mention an international issue. Reflecting these priorities, respondents show a clear preference for greater spending on domestic programs compared to defense and foreign aid.

EUROPE’S ROLE ON THE WORLD STAGE

- Contrary to what has been portrayed in the popular press recently, respondents show strong affinity for both the European Union and the United States. When asked to rate their feelings toward a number of other countries, respondents in four of

the six European countries rate the European Union highest—even higher than their European neighbors. The exceptions, Great Britain and Poland, rate the United States highest.

- When forced to choose whether the EU or the United States is more important to their country’s vital interests, a majority of respondents in each country choose the EU. The French (93%) and the Dutch (88%) appear the most settled on this issue, with the British (56%) and Germans (55%) seemingly more conflicted.
- A clear majority in all six countries would like the EU to become a superpower comparable in influence to the United States. However, nearly all of these respondents (more than 8 in 10) support such a development as a means for Europe to better cooperate with the United States rather than to compete with it.
- A substantial majority in all six countries find it “very desirable” or “somewhat desirable” that the European Union exert strong leadership in the world.
- Large majorities of Europeans place greater weight on the importance of economic rather than military power.

EUROPEAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE

- Europeans generally perceive threats to their countries in the same way—if not with the same intensity—as Americans. More Europeans in all six countries consider international terrorism as an extremely important threat to their vital interests over the next 10 years than any other threat about which they were questioned. Other threats perceived as extremely important are (in rank order): Iraq acquiring weapons of mass destruction, global warming, Islamic fundamentalism, and the conflict in the Middle East.
- Europeans indicate a strong willingness to use force in a broad range of circumstances, but most particularly for humanitarian purposes and to uphold international law. Majorities in each country support a broad range of measures to combat terrorism, but “helping poor countries develop their economies” receives the most support.
- A majority of respondents in all six countries surveyed would support a U.S. attack on Iraq, but only 1 in 10 would do so without UN approval and the support of allies. When respondents are presented with various scenarios under which the United States might attack Iraq, the factor that most heavily influences support for their country’s participation is the presence of a UN mandate, which boosts the level of support by 21%.

EUROPEAN VIEWS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

- European respondents are perhaps most divided on their evaluations of the Bush administration’s handling of U.S. foreign policy. Sixty-two percent of Polish respondents and 57% of the Italians regard the administration’s overall handling of foreign policy as either “excellent” or “good,” while the Germans (36%), British (30%), Dutch (28%), and French (21%) are more critical. Respondents give the Bush administration relatively high marks for

its handling of international terrorism, but very low marks for its handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq.

- Majorities in each of the six countries surveyed believe U.S. foreign policy is at least somewhat to blame for September 11 attacks. At the same time, larger majorities in each believe the United States is now seeking to protect itself from further attacks, as opposed to using the attacks as an excuse to enforce its will around the globe.
- A solid majority of Europeans find it “very desirable” or “somewhat desirable” for the United States to exert strong leadership in world affairs.

EUROPE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

- Globalization—the rallying cry that brought so many European protesters to the streets in recent years—ranks relatively low on the list of threats perceived as extremely important by Europeans. In each country, respondents are divided over whether globalization is a “good” or “bad” thing, with slight majorities in all countries except Poland viewing it overall as a good thing. Those who think globalization is a good thing are also more likely to support the use of “genetic manipulation” in agriculture and food production, although most Europeans oppose it.



CHAPTER ONE

An Inwardly Focused Continent

This chapter examines Europeans' priorities one year after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. It finds Europeans largely focused inward, preoccupied with domestic economic and social issues rather than broader foreign policy concerns. This is reflected in Europeans' preferences for spending on government programs, with a far larger proportion of Europeans favoring increases in domestic programs than increases in defense spending or economic aid to other nations.

FOCUS ON DOMESTIC CONCERNS

At the time this survey was taken, Europe faced a number of pressing internal challenges, including a continent-wide economic slowdown, political tensions associated with immigration, the reform of the institutions of the European Union, and the EU's enlargement to include 10 additional countries, predominantly from Central and Eastern Europe.

The survey confirms this preoccupation with internal matters. In response to the open-ended question, "What would you say is the most important issue facing [your country] today?" respondents in all six countries overwhelmingly cite domestic issues, particularly economic and social concerns. Eighty-one percent of the

responses are of a domestic nature, compared to 4% that relate to the European Union or issues within its purview, and 12% that are of international scope. Such an inward focus is not unusual. In the 1998 Chicago Council survey of U.S. attitudes—the last before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—Americans were asked a very similar question¹ and mentioned foreign problems just 7.3% of the time. However, in 2002 more Americans (33%) cite terrorism as the biggest problem facing their country than any other, displacing domestic concerns at the top of this list for the first time in CCFR surveys since 1974.

For Europe as a whole,² the most frequently mentioned issue (24% of total mentions) is unemployment, followed by crime (11%), the economy (7%) and immigration and race relations (7%).³ Unemployment tops the list in Poland, Italy, and Germany. The Poles are particularly preoccupied with the issue, volunteering it as an answer 51% of the time; the comparative figures in Italy and Germany are 35% and 21%, respectively.

¹ The precise question asked in the 1998 CCFR survey was: "What do you feel are the two or three biggest problems facing the country today?"

² Throughout this report, the figures given for Europe as a whole are weighted on the basis of adult population in each of the six countries surveyed.

³ Responses such as "factory closures" and "lack of industry" were counted as "unemployment."

In France, unemployment is also a prominent concern (26% of total mentions), but crime and law and order are mentioned even more frequently (34%). Crime was a hotly debated political issue during the French legislative elections that took place while this survey was in the field.

In Great Britain and the Netherlands, the countries with the lowest unemployment rates, the focus is on more parochial concerns. “Race relations and immigration” is the most frequently mentioned issue (17% of total mentions) in Great Britain, followed by the National Health Service (11%) and issues related to Europe, the EU, the common market and/or the single European currency (10%). In the Netherlands, the most cited issues are “family values” (12%) and the “assassination of politicians” (10%). The former reflects a conservative backlash in the Netherlands against the perceived loosening of societal norms and values since the 1960s,

More Europeans support the expansion of domestic programs than defense and foreign aid.

a sense that lawlessness is eroding the unique Dutch way of life. The latter is a reference to the assassination of the controversial, right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn in May, which shocked the Dutch populace.

International issues do not appear to be very salient. For Europe as a whole, terrorism is the most frequently mentioned international issue, but it constitutes only 3% of the total mentions. Terrorism is followed closely by the Middle East and more generic mentions of “defense and foreign affairs” (each 2%). Again, this relatively low concern about international problems compared to domestic issues is consistent with previous CCFR studies of Americans. In the 1998 CCFR survey, the biggest problem of an international nature receiving the most frequent mention from Americans was “too much foreign aid sent to other countries” (4%).

The international issues that are of some concern vary significantly across countries in Europe. The Germans mention terrorism the most frequently (6%),

followed by the British (5%), and the Dutch (4%). The Middle East is mentioned by 8% of respondents in the Netherlands and 5% in Germany. Among the French, no single international issue is mentioned by more than 1% of respondents.

Interestingly, respondents in Poland—a candidate country for the European Union—and in Great Britain—a sometimes reluctant EU member that has yet to adopt the single currency—mention issues dealing with Europe the most frequently (13% and 10%, respectively) as the most important issue facing their countries.

MORE SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC PROGRAMS THAN DEFENSE OR AID

The focus on domestic issues is reflected in attitudes toward government spending. When asked about various government programs, more Europeans support the expansion of domestic programs than defense and foreign aid. Seventy-nine percent of Europeans favor expanding programs to combat violence and crime, whereas 17% want them kept about the same, and only 3% want to cut them back. Seventy-five percent would like aid to education expanded, while 21% would like to keep it about the same, and 3% prefer to cut it back. Sixty-seven percent of Europeans would like social wel-




Figure 1-1




Figure 1-2

fare and health programs expanded, while 26% want them kept the same, and 6% say cut back. Support for expansion of government spending for education and for social welfare is slightly lower in France than in the other countries surveyed, probably because French government spending in these areas is already quite high.

European support for increased defense spending is significantly lower, with more Europeans wanting to cut back spending than to expand it (see Figure 1-1). Poland, which recently joined NATO and has faced pressure from other members to upgrade its military

capabilities, is the only country surveyed with a plurality in favor of expanding defense spending (45% expand vs. 36% keep same and 14% cut back). Slightly greater numbers of people in France and Great Britain—the two military powers in Europe—favor expanding spending (28% and 24%, respectively) than cutting it back (23% and 21% vs. 47% and 53% keep same). In Germany and the Netherlands, far larger numbers would like to cut back defense spending (45% and 38%) than to expand it (14% and 6% vs. 38% and 53% keep same). In Italy, a full majority would like to cut it back (52% vs. 33% keep same and 12% expand).

Europeans are more supportive of expanding economic aid to other countries than they are of expanding defense spending, but a plurality would still prefer to keep spending about the same (see Figure 1-2).

Significantly more French and Italians, who have long traditions of humanitarian aid, would like to see economic assistance expanded (58% and 45%) rather than cut back (2% and 15% vs. 35% and 38% keep same). Conversely, slightly more British, Germans, and Dutch favor reducing economic assistance (31%, 29%, and 21%) rather than expanding it (22%, 20%, and 18% vs. 45%, 48%, and 58% keep same). The Poles, who are not as wealthy as the others, clearly feel this should not be a priority at the moment, with 44% of respondents in favor of cutting back (vs. 39% keep same and 12% expand).



CHAPTER TWO

Europe's Role on the World Stage

As the European Union endeavors to develop a common foreign and security policy, how do Europeans understand the world and their role in it? Europeans share a common view of friends and allies, exhibiting warmer feelings toward Western democracies than other states. They perceive the European Union to be an influential force in the world—though less so than the United States—and view their own vital interests to be more bound up with the EU than with the United States. Europeans feel that their countries should play an active role in world affairs and favor strong EU leadership on the world stage. In fact, a sizeable majority would like the European Union to be a superpower, not to compete with the United States, but to better cooperate with it. Correspondingly, Europeans would like both the European Union and the United States to be more engaged in the Middle East negotiations, even though they view the conflict through somewhat different lenses than Americans.

WARM FEELINGS TOWARD OTHER WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

When viewing the world around them, Europeans see other Western democracies as close friends and allies.

When asked to rate their feelings toward various countries (as well as the European Union) on a “thermometer” scale from 0 to 100—with 100 meaning very warm, 50 neutral, and 0 very cold—Europeans, on average, express the warmest feelings towards the European Union (see Figure 2-1). The Italians, French, Dutch, and Germans all give the European Union their highest ratings—higher than they give their major

Europeans, on average, express the warmest feelings towards the European Union of all countries about which they were asked.

European neighbors or the United States. This is surprising given all the negative talk in the European press about “those bureaucrats in Brussels,” but perhaps Europeans now feel a portion of their own identity to be bound up with the union as a whole.

The British and Poles give the United States their highest ratings (68 and 65 degrees, respectively). Strikingly, the United States also receives the second highest rating from the Italians (68 degrees) and

THERMOMETER OF NATIONS

Mean temperature for each nation.

Warm feelings >50°, cool feelings <50°




Figure 2-1

INFLUENCE OF COUNTRIES							
<i>Mean score on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 meaning extremely influential.</i>							
	GERMANY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	THE NETHERLANDS	POLAND	EUROPE
The United States	8.7	8.8	8.9	9.3	8.7	8.8	8.9
EU	6.8	7.2	6.7	7.5	6.9	7.5	7.1
Germany	6.2	6.1	5.9	6.5	6.2	6.3	6.2
France	5.4	6.3	5.4	6.2	6.0	5.5	5.8
Great Britain	6.2	5.8	6.9	6.9	6.4	6.3	6.4
Russia	6.1	5.5	6.0	6.3	6.2	6.2	6.0
China	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.1	6.1	5.2	5.8

Figure 2-2

Germans (63 degrees) as well as the third highest from the French (60 degrees, just after Germany, which receives 62 degrees) and the Dutch (59 degrees, just after Great Britain and Germany). This suggests that reports of rising anti-Americanism in Europe may be overblown. Europeans appear to like the United States at least as much as their major European neighbors.

The three largest European countries—Germany, France, and Great Britain—receive similar ratings from their European neighbors. Germany receives a high 62 degrees from the French and a low 51 degrees from the Poles. France receives a high 61 degrees from the Italians and a low 55 degrees from the British. Great Britain receives a high 63 degrees from the Dutch and a low 57 degrees from the French and the Poles.

Europeans have neutral to slightly negative feelings toward Russia. Among the six countries surveyed, the Italians have the warmest feelings towards the Russians (53 degrees) and the Poles the coldest (42 degrees).

Israel receives slightly lower ratings than Russia from all but the Dutch. While the Dutch give Israel a high 48 degrees (vs. 46 degrees for Russia), the Poles give it a low 29 degrees, just above the rating they give Iraq (25 degrees).

Europeans uniformly have very unfavorable feelings toward Iraq. Even the French, who have traditionally had close political and economic ties with Iraq, give it a mean score of only 33 degrees (the highest it receives).

Among the countries surveyed, the Germans have the most negative feelings toward Iraq, giving it 16 degrees.

UNITED STATES PERCEIVED TO BE PREEMINENT

Europeans perceive the United States to be the most influential country on the international scene. When asked to rank various countries on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 meaning extremely influential, respondents give the United States the highest rating, with Italians giving it an average high of 9.3 and the Dutch and Germans an average low of 8.7 (see Figure 2-2).

The European Union is ranked as the second most influential “country” by all but the British, who rank their own country before the European Union. The British give the EU an average 6.7 in terms of influence, while the Italians and Poles give it 7.5—still far below the United States.

The largest European countries are perceived to be relatively similar in influence. Great Britain receives a high of 6.9 from the Italians and a low of 5.8 from the French. Germany receives a high of 6.5 from the Italians and a low of 5.9 from the British. Finally, France receives a high of 6.2 from the Italians and a low of 5.4 from the Germans and the British.

Europeans regard Russia and China to be less influential than the European Union and on a par in terms




Figure 2-3

of influence with Great Britain, Germany, and France. Russia receives a high of 6.3 from the Italians and a low of 5.5 from the French. China receives a high of 6.1 from the British, Dutch, and Italians, and a low of 5.2 from the Poles.

PERCEPTIONS OF VITAL INTERESTS

While Europeans have warm feelings for the United States and regard it as the most influential country in the world, they view the European Union as more important to their countries. When forced to choose, a strong majority of Europeans regard the European Union as more important to their country's vital interests than the United States (see Figure 2-3). The French are the most convinced of this, with 93% choosing the European Union. The British are the most ambivalent, with 56% choosing the European Union and 37% the United States. The Germans also seem to be torn—55% believe the European Union is more important to their country's vital interests, as opposed to 20% who choose the United States, but a remarkable 22% of respondents volunteer the answer “both equally.” The Dutch, who are viewed as strongly Atlanticist in orientation, however, overwhelmingly regard the European Union as more important to their vital interests (88%). Notably, those who regard military strength as the main determinant of power and influence are more likely to regard the

United States as more important to their country's vital interests.

DESIRE FOR ACTIVE ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Europeans would like their countries to be engaged in the world. When asked, “Do you think it best for the future of [your own country] if we take an active part in world affairs or stay out of world affairs,” the vast majority of respondents in each country surveyed choose the former (see Figure 2-4). The Italians, French, and British are most supportive of their countries taking an active part in world affairs (90%, 86%, and 82%, respectively). The Germans and the Dutch are somewhat more cautious (65% and 72%). Twelve percent of German respondents spontaneously answered “not sure” to this question, suggesting that many Germans continue to have conflicting feelings about whether their country should play an international role. Younger as well as better educated Germans are more likely to support an active role for their country in world affairs.

Europeans would also like to see the EU play a lead role on the world stage. When asked, “From your point of view, how desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs,” a substantial




Figure 2-4




Figure 2-5

majority of respondents in all six countries surveyed (81% Europe-wide) find it either “very desirable” or “somewhat desirable” that the European Union do so (see Figure 2-5). The Dutch (92% very or somewhat desirable) and Italians (89%) are the most enthusiastic, while the Poles (68%)—perhaps because they are not yet a part of the European Union—are the most reluctant. German (82%) and British support (79%) appears to have increased since a USIA poll conducted in April 1998 found that 72% of Germans and 76% of the British saw EU leadership as very or somewhat desir-

able. Support in France has remained constant since the 1998 poll, at 83%.

DESIRE FOR EU TO BECOME A SUPERPOWER

Europeans would like the European Union to become a superpower. Presented two options, a majority in all countries surveyed except Germany say that the EU should become a superpower like the United States (see Figure 2-6). Fewer than a quarter endorse the view that the U.S. should remain the only superpower. The French and Italians are particularly supportive of the EU becoming a superpower, with 91% and 76% of respondents, respectively, in favor, while the Germans

A majority in all countries surveyed except Germany say that the EU should become a superpower like the United States.

are once again the most cautious (48% in favor). A remarkable 17% of respondents overall, along with 25% of the Germans and the Dutch, volunteered the response “no country should be a superpower,” suggesting a strong strain of pacifist feelings in both countries.

By overwhelming margins, Europeans do not view a strong European Union as a competitor to the United States. In response to a followup question asked of those who favor the European Union becoming a superpower,

ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE AS SUPERPOWERS

Percentage who choose each of the following as closest to their view.

	GERMANY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	THE NETHERLANDS	POLAND	EUROPE
U.S. should remain only superpower	22	3	20	7	11	12	14
EU should become superpower like U.S.	48	91	56	76	59	63	65

Figure 2-6

large majorities in each country surveyed say they favor this in order to “cooperate more effectively with the United States in dealing with international problems.” Only a handful of respondents in every country but Germany say they favor the EU becoming a superpower in order to “better compete with the United States.” A high of 92% of Italian respondents opt for cooperation, as opposed to 70% in Germany. Only in the latter country do a small but significant proportion (22%) of those wanting the European Union to become a superpower see this as a means to better compete with the United States.

European support for the EU becoming a superpower drops significantly if such status requires an increase in defense spending. Those who said they favored the EU becoming a superpower were subse-

The proportion willing to countenance the EU becoming a superpower if it means increases in military expenditures may be less than half in each country surveyed.

quently asked, “Would you be willing for Europe to be a superpower even if this meant greater military expenditures?” Of this group, small majorities in Great Britain (58%), France (53%), Germany (51%), and Poland (50%) as well as a plurality in Italy (49%) say they would. Fifty-seven percent of the Dutch would not favor the EU becoming a superpower under such conditions, compared to 39% who would. This suggests that the proportion of the overall population willing to countenance the EU becoming a superpower if it means commensurate increases in military expenditures may be less than half in each country surveyed.

Those who do not want the EU to become a superpower tend to want the EU to play a regional role instead. The small minority who say they favor the United States remaining the only superpower were subsequently asked what role they foresaw for the European




Figure 2-7

Union. A substantial majority in all but Great Britain (where it is a plurality of 42%) feel that the European Union should play “only a European role, relying on the United States for global responsibilities,” rather than “not deal with international problems.”

WHAT KIND OF GLOBAL ROLE?

A subsequent question provides further evidence that a majority of Europeans are ready for the EU to play a more global role alongside the United States. A majority in all the six countries would like to see the European Union be more involved in the Middle East negotiations, while also bearing more of the political and eco-

conomic costs. The Italians and the British are the most supportive of such a development (73% and 71%, respectively, in favor), while the Germans and the Poles are the least (57% and 56%, respectively).

Narrow majorities of Europeans would accept the idea of a division of labor with the United States. Some analysts have argued that the European Union and the United States might do better to specialize in their roles in the world, with the United States taking the lead in military conflicts, and the European Union assisting poor countries to develop their economies and reconstructing societies after a war. When asked, slim majorities in five of the six countries surveyed agree with this “cook-dishwasher” division of labor. The Germans are the most supportive, with 57% in favor, but the French are opposed, with 55% rejecting such a division of labor. Not surprisingly, support for such an idea is strongest among respondents who believe that the European Union should not become a superpower.

For Europeans, the priority seems to be to focus on nonmilitary approaches to dealing with international problems, as they appear to view these as more important and possibly more effective. They believe the EU should play a broader role in the world, but as a different kind of superpower—one that complements rather than competes with the United States.

This is consistent with the finding that Europeans regard economic power as more important than military power. When asked, “Which of the following do you think is more important in determining a country’s overall power and influence in the world—a country’s economic strength or its military strength?” respondents in all six countries overwhelmingly choose economic strength (see Figure 2-7). Eighty-nine percent of the French and the Dutch view economic strength as more important, versus 80% of Germans who view it as more important.



CHAPTER THREE

European Threat Perceptions and the Use of Force

Contrary to the assertions of some American commentators, Europeans are neither unaware nor indifferent to the hard security threats facing them. Europeans regard international terrorism, Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction, and Islamic fundamentalism as extremely important threats. Moreover, majorities are willing to use force to combat these and other threats as well as for more humanitarian purposes. Europeans would consider supporting an attack on Iraq provided there is a UN mandate and the support of allies.

CONSCIOUS OF NEW THREATS

Europeans are concerned about what are often called the “new security threats”—international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. When asked to evaluate a list of possible threats to their countries’ vital interests over the next 10 years, more Europeans identify international terrorism as an “extremely important” threat than any other item queried (see Figure 3-1). The British feel the most threatened by international terrorism—74% regard it as an extremely important threat. The Dutch are the least worried, with only 54% regarding it as extremely important.

Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction also concerns a significant number of Europeans. Majorities in four of the six countries surveyed view it as an extremely important threat, with the most British respondents (75%) regarding it so. On the other hand, the French and the Poles are a bit more sanguine about a possible threat from Iraq, with only 43% and 45%, respectively, characterizing it as an extremely important threat. Nevertheless, European concerns about international terrorism and Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction would seem to contradict the widely held perception in the United States that Europeans have yet to adjust their thinking to the new realities of the post-September 11 world.

Europeans continue to view one pre-September 11 issue—global warming—with significant concern. Majorities in Italy (64%), France (52%), and Great Britain (52%) as well as a plurality in Germany (47%) look upon global warming as an extremely important threat. On the other hand, less than one in four Poles (24%) regard it so.

Islamic fundamentalism and military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors are the next threats that large numbers of Europeans judge as critical. Majorities or pluralities in all countries surveyed

PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS							
<i>Percentage who view each of the following as an “extremely important” threat to their country’s vital interest.</i>							
	GERMANY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	THE NETHERLANDS	POLAND	EUROPE
International terrorism	63	60	74	67	54	55	64
Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction	60	43	75	57	52	45	57
Global warming	47	52	52	64	42	24	49
Islamic fundamentalism	55	46	55	48	47	19	47
Military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors	47	42	51	42	32	20	42
Large number of immigrants and refugees coming into your country	23	34	54	52	30	30	37
Tensions between India and Pakistan	35	22	48	27	18	17	30
Globalization	17	21	25	24	10	14	20
Development of China as a world power	13	18	28	19	16	15	18
Economic competition from the U.S.	10	26	18	20	12	19	18
Political turmoil in Russia	14	12	12	12	9	27	14

Figure 3-1

except Poland regard Islamic fundamentalism as an extremely important threat, with a high of 55% in both Great Britain and Germany. Once again, Poland is the outlier, with only 19% viewing it as extremely important (20% don’t know). Similarly, 51% of the British and 47% of the Germans, but only 20% of the Poles, view a potential conflict in the Middle East as an extremely important threat.

Europeans differ somewhat in their views of immigration. Majorities in Britain and Italy (54% and 52%, respectively) consider large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into their countries to be an extremely important threat. However, despite the recent success of

right-wing candidates campaigning on anti-immigration platforms, not nearly as many people in France, the Netherlands, or Poland (34%, 30%, and 30%, respectively) consider it so. Surprisingly, the country least concerned about immigration is Germany (23%).

Significantly fewer Europeans regard the remaining threats about which they were queried—tensions between India and Pakistan, political turmoil in Russia, globalization, the development of China as a world power, and economic competition from the United States—as extremely important. Only in one case—British concerns about the India-Pakistan conflict—does a plurality (48%) view one of these threats as extremely

important. The relative lack of concern among Europeans about globalization is striking, given that the issue has brought so many European protesters to the streets in recent years.

Half of the European sample were asked at random how important this battery of threats is to the vital interests of Europe, rather than to their own country. For the most part, there are no significant differences in the responses, indicating that Europeans clearly associate the security of their own country with that of Europe as a whole. The notable exception is Poland, where more respondents tend to view many of the threats as important to the vital interests of Europe than of Poland.

BROAD WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE

Often berated by Americans for spending too little on defense and putting too much faith in economic and diplomatic tools, Europeans appear willing, at least in principle, to use force in a broad range of circumstances. When presented a series of scenarios for the use of troops, quite solid majorities in every country surveyed approve of the use of their own country's military troops in five of six cases (see Figure 3-2). Moreover, the

proportions of respondents supporting the use of troops in particular cases is remarkably similar across countries, suggesting an emerging European consensus on the appropriate uses of force. Not surprisingly given their

Support for various uses of troops is remarkably similar across countries, suggesting an emerging European consensus on the appropriate uses of force.

history, the proportion of Germans supporting the use of force in each case is about 10 percentage points lower than of other Europeans.

The case that elicits the highest level of European support is the use of troops to assist a population struck by famine. Overwhelming majorities in each country surveyed support the use of troops for this purpose, with a high of 93% in the Netherlands and a low of 83% in Germany. Europeans give upholding international law and liberating hostages the second and third highest levels of support. The former receives a high of 86% approval in the Netherlands and a low of 68% in

SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF TROOPS IN VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES							
<i>Percentage who approve of the use of troops in the following situations.</i>							
	GERMANY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	THE NETHERLANDS	POLAND	EUROPE
To assist a population struck by famine	83	89	90	91	93	92	88
To uphold international law	68	84	84	83	86	84	80
To liberate hostages	69	83	82	83	80	78	78
To destroy a terrorist camp	62	84	84	75	70	75	75
To bring peace to a region where there is civil war	58	76	75	85	73	71	72
To ensure the supply of oil	40	46	61	51	47	52	49

Figure 3-2

SUPPORT FOR MEASURES TO FIGHT TERRORISM							
<i>Percentage who favor the following measures to combat international terrorism.</i>							
	GERMANY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	THE NETHERLANDS	POLAND	EUROPE
Helping poor countries develop their economies	84	93	91	97	92	92	91
Attacks by ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities	58	80	78	61	77	75	69
Air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities	58	75	76	60	73	75	68
Restricting immigration into own country	44	62	74	75	57	69	63
Assassination of individual terrorist leaders	40	50	56	48	62	72	51

Figure 3-3

Germany; the latter receives a high of 83% in Italy and again a low of 69% in Germany.

Slightly smaller, but still quite substantial, majorities of European respondents are willing to use troops to attack terrorist camps or halt civil wars. In the former case, a high of 84% in Great Britain and France and a low of 62% in Germany approve of the use of troops. In the latter, a high of 85% of Italians and a low of 58% of Germans approve of the use of troops.

A narrow plurality of Europeans support the use of troops to ensure the supply of oil. There is a solid majority (61%) in favor of the use of troops for this purpose in Great Britain as well as more narrow ones for Poland (52%) and Italy (51%), as opposed to a minority of only 40% in Germany.

In all these cases, the younger the respondent, the more willing they are to use force. Germany is the one exception, where the age of the respondent has the least bearing on responses. Those European countries that spend the most on defense—Great Britain and France—also appear to have populations that are more favorable toward the use of troops.

PREPARED TO COMBAT TERRORISM

With regard to the specific issue of terrorism, Europeans support addressing this threat through a variety of means. Presented with five different measures for combating terrorism, majorities in each country surveyed support their use in almost every case (see Figure 3-3). The largest number of Europeans favor helping poor countries develop their economies, with 97% in Italy supporting such an approach, compared to 84% in Germany. The next most highly favored response is attacks by ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities, with 80% of the French in support, compared to 58% of Germans. A comparable number of Europeans support air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities, with the British the most supportive (76%) and the Germans, again, the least (58%).

Significant majorities in all but Germany (44% in favor) also support restricting immigration into their countries as a way to combat terrorism, with the most sizable majority in Italy (75%). The assassination of ter-

ATTITUDES ON USING FORCE IN IRAQ							
<i>Percentage who choose each of the following as closest to their view.</i>							
	GERMANY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	THE NETHERLANDS	POLAND	EUROPE
The U.S. should not invade Iraq	28	27	20	33	18	26	26
The U.S. should only invade with UN approval and support of allies	56	63	69	54	70	53	60
The U.S. should invade Iraq even if they have to do it alone	12	6	10	10	11	10	10

Figure 3-4

rorist leaders receives the highest level of support in Poland (72%) and majority backing in all but Italy (48%) and Germany (40%).

CONDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR AN ATTACK ON IRAQ

Americans regard Europeans as resistant to a U.S. attack on Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein. In fact, Europeans appear willing to support such attacks, albeit only under certain conditions (see Figure 3-4). When presented with three alternatives about invading Iraq, majorities in each country surveyed say the United States should only invade Iraq with UN approval and the support of its allies, while roughly one in four indicate that the United States should not invade Iraq, and only one in ten say the United States should invade Iraq even if they have to do it alone. The Dutch and the British are the most supportive of an attack on Iraq, while the Poles and Italians are the most opposed.

A series of experimental questions provides further evidence of European willingness to take part in an attack on Iraq provided there is UN approval. Each European respondent was presented with one of eight scenarios under which the United States might attack. To create these scenarios, three variables were rotated at random—the reason for attacking, the presence or absence of UN approval, and the expected number of

Western casualties. The question as a whole reads as follows:

“Imagine now that Iraq is found to [be acquiring weapons of mass destruction/have helped the terrorist group of Osama bin Laden]. The U.S. is considering attacking Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein [with/without] the approval of the United Nations. The war is expected to entail [many/few] Western casualties. Should (country) government take part in this military action or should we stay out of it?”

In all scenarios in which there was UN approval, a modest majority of Europeans, ranging from 51% to 56%, say they would support taking part, and in no scenario without UN approval do respondents in any country favor taking part. Only the Germans consistently oppose participation under any circumstance. Polish and Italian support varies significantly depending upon the variables presented, while the British, French, and Dutch consistently support taking action provided there is UN approval.

Surprisingly, the presence or absence of significant casualties in the respective scenarios has little effect on respondents’ willingness to have their country take part. The two stated reasons for attacking—either because Iraq is acquiring weapons of mass destruction or helping the terrorist group of bin Laden—elicit very similar levels of support.



C H A P T E R F O U R

European Views of American Foreign Policy

Europeans have reservations about certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy. They give the Bush administration poor marks for its handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the situation in Iraq, and global warming. In addition, a slight majority of Europeans believe U.S. foreign policy contributed to the September 11 attacks, though they do not think the United States is using these attacks as an excuse to enforce its will around the globe. Despite these concerns, Europeans support the United States playing a strong leadership role in the world, though they would like to see it spend more on economic aid to other countries, while curbing its military expenditures.

MIXED REVIEWS OF THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION

As mentioned earlier, Europeans like the United States as much as their major European neighbors, and there does not appear to be widespread anti-Americanism in Europe. Despite their affinity for the United States, Europeans have reservations about certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy, giving the Bush administration mixed marks for its handling of foreign policy (see Figure 4-1). Only a majority of Poles (62%) and Italians (57%) give the administration marks of either “good” or

BUSH ADMINISTRATION HANDLING OF OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY							
<i>Percentage who rate the Bush administration's handling of overall foreign policy as "excellent," "good," "fair," or "poor."</i>							
	GERMANY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	THE NETHERLANDS	POLAND	EUROPE
Excellent	3	1	3	10	1	7	4
Good	33	20	27	47	27	55	34
Fair	50	53	44	28	58	22	42
Poor	12	21	22	9	12	4	14

Figure 4-1




Figure 4-2

“excellent” for its overall handling of foreign policy. The Germans (36%), British (30%), Dutch (28%), and French (21%) are decidedly less generous.

Of the different dimensions of U.S. foreign policy surveyed (see Figure 4-2), the Bush administration surprisingly receives the highest marks from its European allies for its handling of relations with Europe. In this area it receives “good” or “excellent” marks from 69% of Poles, 65% of Italians, 48% of Germans, 38% of the British, 37% of the Dutch, and 29% of the French.

The administration receives similar marks for its handling of international terrorism. Fifty-three percent of Poles, 51% of Germans, 50% of Italians, 48% of the British, 45% of the Dutch, and 36% of the French rate

its performance as either “good” or “excellent” in this area.

The administration receives somewhat lower marks for its handling of the war in Afghanistan. Forty percent of the Italians, 39% of the British, 38% of the Poles, 36% of the Dutch, 34% of the Germans, and 23% of the French give it “good” or “excellent” marks for its handling of the war.

European allies are even more critical when asked about specific issues that have been contentious in the U.S.-European relationship. Europeans give the Bush administration the lowest marks for its handling of global warming. Only 29% of Poles, 16% of Italians, 13% of Germans, 8% of the Dutch, 7% of the British, and 6% of the French regard its performance on this issue as either “good” or “excellent.” The administration also gets low marks for its handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the situation in Iraq.


There are significant divergences in perceptions of the Bush administration’s performance across countries. The French consistently are the most critical in their evaluations of the administration’s foreign policy performance, while the Poles and Italians are generally the least critical. The British and Dutch, traditionally viewed as the “Atlanticists” in Europe, are much more critical than might be expected. Those who identify themselves politically as being on the left are more likely to be critical than those on the right.

THE UNITED STATES AND 9/11

European concerns about U.S. conduct overseas is reflected in their evaluations of the events of September 11 and the war on terrorism that has ensued. Slight majorities in all six European countries surveyed either “strongly agree” or “agree somewhat” with the statement, “American foreign policy has contributed to the September 11 attacks” (see Figure 4-3). The French (63%), the Dutch (59%), and the British (57%) are the most firm supporters of this view. Consistently across countries, this view is most widely held by the more educated and those who identify themselves as on the left politically.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND 9/11

Percentage who agree American foreign policy contributed to the September 11 attacks.



Percentage who say the U.S. is genuinely trying to protect itself from further attacks or is using the attacks as an excuse to enforce its will around the globe.




Figure 4-3

However, with regard to America's conduct since, majorities in all six countries reject the view that the United States is using these attacks as an excuse to enforce its will around the globe in favor of the view that the United States is genuinely seeking to protect itself from further attacks. The British are the most convinced of genuine American motives (64% say it is protecting itself), followed by the Germans (61%), Italians (59%), Poles (58%), and the Dutch (57%). The French are somewhat more skeptical, with 51% saying the United States is protecting itself and 37% saying the attacks are an excuse to enforce its will.

NO INCREASES IN DEFENSE, BUT EXPAND ECONOMIC AID

European attitudes with regard to U.S. spending on defense and economic assistance provide a clearer sense of how Europeans view American priorities in the world.

Europeans would like the United States to keep its defense spending at about current levels or even cut it back. Only in Poland is there significant support (37%) for increased U.S. defense spending, equal to the number who want U.S. defense spending to be kept about the same. A plurality of the British (43%) and the

Majorities in all six countries reject the view that the United States is using these attacks as an excuse to enforce its will around the globe in favor of the view that the United States is genuinely seeking to protect itself from further attacks.

French (38%) would like to see it kept about the same, while a plurality of the Germans (39%), the Dutch (45%), and the Italians (47%) would like it cut back. Those wanting Europe to become a superpower are more likely to oppose increased U.S. defense spending, while those favoring a division of labor between the United States and Europe—in which the United States provides the military firepower and Europe focuses on humanitarian aid and postwar reconstruction—are more likely to support it.

When it comes to economic aid to other nations, a significant majority of the Poles (68%) and Italians (62%) and a plurality of the Germans (49%), French (46%), and British (42%) would like to see the United States expand its aid programs. Dutch views are not too dissimilar, with a slight plurality (44%) wanting U.S. aid kept about the same, 41% wanting it expanded, and 10% wanting to cut it back.

SUPPORTIVE OF A U.S. LEADERSHIP ROLE

Despite their critical evaluation of certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy, Europeans, for the most part, want the United States to play a strong role on the world stage. Solid majorities in six countries regard strong U.S. leadership in world affairs as either “very desirable” or “somewhat desirable” (see Figure 4-4), with the Dutch (75%) and the British (72%) the most supportive. The exception is France, which is evenly split on the question (48% “very” or “somewhat desirable” vs. 48% “somewhat” or “very undesirable”).

A subsequent question confirms Europeans’ desire for the United States to play an important role in the world. Asked whether they would like to see the United States more involved in Middle East negotiations, while also bearing more of the costs, almost two-thirds of Europeans respond in the affirmative. Italy is the most supportive (69%), while the French and the Dutch are the least.

Europeans support a more significant U.S. role in the Middle East, even though Europe and the United States view the Middle East through somewhat different lenses. Americans have much warmer feelings toward Israel than Europeans (55 degrees vs. 38 degrees on the “feelings thermometer”). Conversely, more Europeans




Figure 4-4

than Americans favor the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza strip (72% vs. 40%). Despite these differences, Europeans want the United States to be more rather than less engaged in the region.



C H A P T E R F I V E

Europe in a Globalized World

Europeans, having witnessed firsthand the benefits of integration, continue to be strong supporters of multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations and NATO. Despite questions about NATO's role in a post-Cold War world, a clear majority of Europeans still consider NATO essential. Europeans feel less certain, however, about the impact of globalization and the use of biotechnology in agriculture and food production. Of the two, globalization is viewed more favorably, with slight majorities in all countries except Poland viewing globalization as a positive phenomenon. The trade prac-

tices of the United States are of concern to Europeans, particularly the French, who strongly believe that the United States practices unfair trade with Europe.

STRONG SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Europeans are strong supporters of multilateral institutions. When given a list of international institutions, a majority of respondents favor strengthening all of them (see Figure 5-1). Of the five institutions (the United

STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS							
<i>Percentage who say the following institutions need to be strengthened.</i>							
	GERMANY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	THE NETHERLANDS	POLAND	EUROPE
United Nations	75	67	81	82	76	69	75
NATO	62	62	66	61	62	68	63
World Trade Organization	56	58	59	66	69	50	59
International Monetary Fund	41	59	50	70	55	49	53
World Bank	47	53	52	62	57	54	53

Figure 5-1

Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, NATO, and the World Bank), the UN receives the highest level of support, with three of four respondents overall in favor of strengthening it. The Italians are the most supportive (82%) and the French the least (67%).

NATO ranks second, with a striking uniformity of support from all six countries (around 60%). The Poles, as new NATO members, are the most supportive of strengthening it (68%).

Overall, roughly five in ten Europeans want to strengthen the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The Italians are the most supportive in both cases (62% and 70%, respectively), while the Germans are the least (47% and 41%, respectively). A similar number of Europeans want to strengthen the World Trade Organization. Support is greatest among the Dutch (69%) and weakest among the Poles (50%).

NATO STILL ESSENTIAL

Despite questions about NATO's relevance in the post-September 11 era, a solid majority of Europeans still believe NATO is essential to their own security (see Figure 5-2). The most likely to regard NATO as essential are the British (76%), followed closely by the

Despite questions about NATO's relevance in the post-September 11 era, a solid majority of Europeans still believe NATO is essential to their own security.

Germans and Dutch (both 74%). The least likely are the French, with 61% regarding it as essential, but that figure is higher than in years past.¹ Throughout the 1990s, roughly 50% of the French supported NATO, although those numbers rose to 68% and 66% in 1995

¹Source: Surveys conducted by the United States Information Agency.




Figure 5-2

and 1999, respectively, when France participated in NATO military operations in the Balkans.

Slight majorities of Europeans favor a second enlargement of NATO to include new members (see Figure 5-3). There is little differentiation among the candidate countries, with almost all receiving around 55% support Europe-wide. Among candidate countries, only the three Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia receive slightly higher levels of support (61% Europe-wide). More surprisingly, 60% of Europeans indicate they favor the expansion of NATO to include Russia, which is not even a candidate country.

The Poles are the most supportive of NATO expansion, confounding expectations that they would turn their backs on their neighbors to the east once they were in the club. With the notable exceptions of Russia and Romania, they show high levels of support for inclusion of all the candidate countries. Germany is the least supportive of expansion and is the only country not in favor of admitting Bulgaria.

Despite the strong European support for NATO as an institution and for its enlargement, few respondents can name the location of the alliance’s headquarters. The Germans are the most informed, with just over half able to identify that NATO is headquartered in Brussels. Only 17% of Italians and 19% of the French are able to do the same.

GLOBALIZATION: MIXED VIEWS

As mentioned previously, few Europeans regard globalization as an extremely important international threat. But Europeans are divided over whether globalization is overall a “good” or “bad” thing, with the exception of the Poles, who take a negative view of globalization.

Majorities in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy and slight pluralities in France and Germany regard globalization as good for their own country’s economy. Only one in four Poles share this view. The number of Polish “don’t know” responses are quite high (one in four), suggesting that there is not sufficient knowledge in Poland about the issue.

Similarly, majorities in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy and slight pluralities in Germany and Poland believe that globalization is good for providing jobs and strengthening the economy in poor countries. This is the only instance in which the Poles view globalization’s impact to be positive. A slight plurality in France believe it is bad for this purpose.

Majorities in France and Germany believe that globalization is good for the maintenance of cultural diversity in the world, but in all other countries pluralities view globalization as negative in this regard. The Poles are among the most negative, but again there are a high level of Polish “don’t know” responses.

Finally, very slight majorities in Great Britain and the Netherlands and pluralities in Germany, France, and Italy regard globalization as having a positive effect on “your own standard of living.” Once again, a slight plurality in Poland regard it as having a negative effect, with 27% providing a “don’t know” response.

MIXED VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AS TRADE PARTNER

Europeans have mixed views of U.S. trade practices. When asked if the United States practices fair or unfair trade with Europe, a majority of German respondents and a plurality of the Dutch, Italians, and Poles say it conducts fair trade. The British are evenly divided (45% unfair and 45% fair), while the French are decidedly negative (74% unfair and 20% fair).

By contrast, Europeans regard Japan as a much more reliable trading partner. A majority of German and Dutch respondents and a plurality of the British, Italians, and Poles regard the Japanese as practicing fair trade. Only the French regard Japanese trade practices as unfair (47% unfair and 37% fair).

NATO ENLARGEMENT							
<i>Percentage who favor expansion of NATO to include the following countries.</i>							
	GERMANY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	THE NETHERLANDS	POLAND	EUROPE
Russia	55	57	67	71	57	52	60
The Baltic states	57	55	59	62	64	75	61
Romania	42	55	55	59	52	62	53
Slovakia	49	54	54	61	59	80	57
Slovenia	48	55	51	61	53	74	56
Bulgaria	45	55	55	60	53	69	55

Figure 5-3

One of the most prominent trade disputes between the United States and Europe has been over biotechnology. U.S. agricultural producers have done battle for over a decade with European consumer groups over their right to export genetically modified products into the European Union. The survey finds that Europeans are generally opposed to such innovations in food production. When asked, “Overall would you say you strongly support, moderately support, moderately oppose, or strongly oppose the use of biotechnology in agriculture and food production?” a majority in every country but the Netherlands indicate moderate or strong opposition. The Dutch are divided, with 49% indicating strong or moderate support and 47% moder-

ate or strong opposition. The Italians (65% moderately or strongly opposed) and the British (69%) have the most negative feelings.

Opposition is even stronger when the question is worded as “genetic manipulation” instead of “biotechnology.” Seventy-nine percent of respondents Europe-wide indicate moderate or strong opposition to the use of “genetic manipulation,” compared to 62% Europe-wide who say they oppose the use of “biotechnology.” The question wording has the greatest effect on French attitudes, with 54% indicating strong or moderate opposition to “biotechnology” and 85% opposing “genetic manipulation.”

The German Marshall Fund commissioned MORI (Market & Opinion Research International) to collect the data for this survey in six European countries: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland. The survey was conducted by telephone interviews in all countries via Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) except Poland, where the telephone penetration is lower, and a face-to-face Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) approach was used. In each of the six European countries, a representative sample of 1,000 adults living in private households was selected. Households were selected by a random digit dialing approach. Pre-tests were conducted in all countries between May 13-22, 2002. The fieldwork for the survey was conducted between June 5 and July 6, 2002, by the institutes in the table below.

Each partner agency used a random digit dialing approach that best suited the country's market with the aim of achieving interviews with a representative national sample. The random last/next birthday method was used, where interviewers asked to speak with the member of the household 18 years or older who had the last/next birthday (except in Great Britain and Poland).

Country	Agency	Fieldwork
Great Britain	MORI	5 - 30 June
Germany	IMAS International	5 - 30 June
Italy	DOXA	5 June - 2 July
France	Demoscopie	5 June - 6 July
The Netherlands	ITC International BV	5 - 29 June
Poland	Taylor Nelson Sofres	5 - 30 June

This systematic respondent selection technique has been shown empirically to produce samples that closely mirror the population in terms of age and gender. In Great Britain and Poland, respondents were chosen randomly, but quotas were set to ensure that a representative cross section of the population was interviewed.

The completed interview lasted approximately 20 to 25 minutes. The overall average response rate was 37%. Nonresponse in telephone interview surveys produces some known biases in survey-derived estimates because participation tends to vary for different subgroups of the population and these subgroups are likely to vary also on questions of substantive interest. In order to compensate for these known biases, data for each country was weighted according to known demographic characteristics of the population (by age, sex, and education). For each individual country, there were no significant differences between the weighted and unweighted figures. The results in this report for the individual countries are therefore unweighted. The figures for Europe as a whole are weighted on the basis of adult population in each of the six countries surveyed.

All the figures given for Europe as a whole in this report include the "don't know" response alternative. In the documents released on September 4, 2002, the "don't know" response alternative for Europe as a whole were not included for 6 of the 32 questions. The inclusion of the "don't know" response alternative will slightly modify the results for the other response alternatives (often by 1 or 2%).

For results based on the total sample in each of the six countries, one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the margin of error is less than plus or minus 1.4 percentage points.