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American and European Public Opinion & Foreign Policy

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

A Wider Atlantic?

The Atlantic alliance is going through its greatest test since taking shape after World War II. The U.S. government and its putative allies in Europe find themselves at odds on a gamut of issues, from familiar flashpoints like trade and culture to fundamental considerations of war, peace, and global leadership. Analysts say the two sides of the Atlantic have been drifting apart for decades, but the common cause of containing the Soviet Union obscured that drift. Now that the Cold War is won, they say, Americans and Europeans find themselves living at different moments in history, with little to say to each other and no common language to say it.

Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) has emerged as an increasingly unified player on the world stage, with a gross domestic product as large as that of the United States and aspirations to be a superpower. Repeatedly, the United States and the EU have clashed publicly on such seemingly trivial trade issues as beef and bananas, but also on larger questions of global governance, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court. While the attacks of September 11, 2001, reminded Americans and Europeans of the fundamental values that bind them together—“Nous sommes tous Américains”—the subsequent war on terrorism has raised fears of American unilateralism for many Europeans once again.

Newspaper reports of widespread anti-Americanism in Europe are mirrored by sharp criticism of Europe from some policy elites in the United States.

A controversial article released in the summer of 2002 by an American academic named Robert Kagan crystallized the growing concerns that Americans have about Europe and vice versa. Kagan argues that the United States and Europe no longer “share a common view of the world, or even ... occupy the same world.” He says they have totally different views of power, multilateral institutions, and international compromise. To America, a threat is something to be removed, by force if necessary, and America often has the force to do it. To Europe, a threat is a problem to be contained, preferably by diplomacy or nonmilitary means, partly because Europe does not have the force to do otherwise.

The key question raised by the prophets of drift is this: Have the United States and Europe retreated so far into their own worldviews that they cannot meet the challenges of the future? This report, the result of a new partnership between The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, seeks answers to that question.

Every four years for nearly three decades, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) has sponsored one of the preeminent surveys of American

public opinion on U.S. foreign policy. This year the CCFR has joined with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) to undertake an even more ambitious study that includes not only an expanded U.S. survey, but, for the first time, a parallel survey conducted in six European countries. In an attempt to capture American and European moods in the new millennium after the shocking terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, the surveys posed largely identical questions on a broad range of international issues to the American and European publics. The result is the most in-depth picture ever painted of the foreign policy attitudes of the world's strongest and most important alliance.

What emerges is at least partly a refutation of the theory of drift at the public level. Similarities in attitudes and perceptions of the world upstage the differences in a wide range of areas, including their perceptions of threats and the distribution of power and influence in the world. But this broad agreement stops short of unanimity and is not the same as vigorous alliance. Some important differences are apparent and could place strains upon U.S.-European relations over the long term.

The CCFR/GMF study adds complexity to the debate on drift, providing new and valuable insights, but does not settle the argument. It shows two peoples with a shared history and value system and a habit of viewing the world with the same eyes, but with some deep differences that often make understanding more difficult. It shows Europeans and Americans still speaking the same moral and strategic language, but often with different accents. It suggests that despite warnings of a fatal drift, there is abundant common ground that continues to bind Europeans and Americans closely together.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The survey design and the analysis of the data presented in this report reflect the joint efforts of the "Worldviews 2002" GMF and CCFR teams. Steve Grand, senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and Steven Kull,

director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and part of the CCFR team, served as co-editors of this report.

The "Worldviews 2002" GMF team was comprised of Steve Grand, Natalie La Balme, Julianne Smith, Pierangelo Isernia, and Philip Everts. The German Marshall Fund would like to express its sincere gratitude to Pierangelo Isernia, professor of political science at the University of Siena, and Philip Everts, director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of Leiden, who served as outside advisors and without whose expertise and support this project would not have been possible.

The survey team would like to acknowledge as well the assistance of a number of GMF colleagues. Special thanks to Craig Kennedy, president of the German Marshall Fund, for his unwavering support and guidance throughout the project. Thanks as well to Karen Donfried, Phillip Henderson, Bill Drozdiak, Heike MacKerron, Alessandra Nervi, John Harris, Ron Asmus, Amaya Bloch-Laine, Ellen Pope, and Arnout Brouwers for their invaluable advice and assistance. Adam Hunter, Myles Nienstadt, Claudia Chantal Zackariya, Bridget Bodane, Abigail Golden-Vazquez, Ryan van Wijk, Pat Griffin, Susan Corke, and Anna Matussek all played important roles in the dissemination of the report. We would also like to recognize Lomangino Studios and Hug Communications for their contributions to the design and production of the final report.

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The “Worldviews 2002” project was a team effort from the beginning. Marshall M. Bouton, president of The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and Benjamin I. Page, Gordon Scott Fulcher professor of decision making in the department of political science at Northwestern University, were the overall co-editors for the Chicago Council. Other members of the team were Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA); Larry Jacobs, professor in the department of political science at the University of Minnesota; Richard Longworth, senior

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The Chicago Council also wishes to express its appreciation to Harris Interactive for all the assistance they have provided with the study. In particular, we want to recognize Hal Quinley, Beverly Romanowski, David Krane, and Shawn Wade for all their hard work throughout the various stages of the project.

The data from this survey will be placed on deposit with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, the Roper Center for Public Opinion in Storrs, Connecticut, and NORC (National Opinion Research Center) at the University of Chicago. It will be available to scholars and other interested professionals. This report will also be available on the Internet at www.worldviews.org.



S U M M A R Y

The Findings in Summary

SHARED PROBLEMS, SHARED PERCEPTIONS

Contrary to talk about a growing transatlantic rift, the American and European publics agree on many fundamental issues. Europeans generally like Americans as much as they like each other, and Americans reciprocate. They have common views of threats and of the distribution of power in the world. Both sides strongly support a multilateral approach to international problems and the strengthening of multilateral institutions. Majorities on both sides show a strong readiness to use military force for a broad range of purposes, and support NATO and its expansion.

- Despite reports of anti-Americanism in Europe, in most cases Europeans feel as warmly toward the United States as they do toward each other. Even the French have warm feelings toward the United States. Americans feel largely the same about Europeans, showing a modest warming trend relative to 1998.
- International terrorism is seen by more Americans and Europeans as an extremely important threat than any other threat about which they were ques-

tioned. Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction follows close behind for both, and both show strong concern about Islamic fundamentalism.

While Americans and Europeans prioritize threats in similar ways, Americans generally show a much higher level of concern about threats than Europeans.

- Contrary to the image of Americans as unilateralist cowboys, Americans are as enthusiastic as the Europeans in their support for global institutions, especially the United Nations. The American public also supports U.S. participation in numerous international treaties that have been signed or ratified by European governments but not the United States.
- Contrary to the image of Europeans as unwilling to use military force, majorities of Europeans as well as Americans show a readiness to use force for a broad range of purposes. Slightly larger majorities in Europe are willing to use force for humanitarian and international purposes, while larger majorities of Americans are ready to use force against terrorism.
- NATO is viewed as still essential on both sides of the Atlantic. Half or more of Europeans and

Americans support the expansion of NATO to include all six candidate countries as well as Russia, for which 6 in 10 Europeans and even more Americans support inclusion.

THE U.S. AND EU ROLES IN THE WORLD

Americans and Europeans want both sides to play strong leadership roles in the world. However, Europeans have some reservations about U.S. power, and Americans do not want sole responsibility for world problems. Both sides share doubts about the Bush administration's handling of foreign policy issues, though Americans are more positive. Europeans want to be a superpower, but seek to cooperate rather than compete with the United States and prefer to put more emphasis on the nonmilitary dimensions of power. Americans want Europeans to share the military burden of maintaining order in the world, but show hesitancy about Europe becoming too strong.

- While an overwhelming majority of Americans support a strong leadership role for the United States, a more modest majority of Europeans support it. However, two out of three Americans feel the United States is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be.
- Majorities of Americans and Europeans give the Bush administration only a “fair” or “poor” rating in its handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the situation in Iraq, and global warming. Americans are relatively positive, while Europeans are less so, regarding the administration's handling of the war in Afghanistan, international terrorism, relations with Europe, and overall foreign policy.
- Overwhelming majorities of Europeans favor the EU exerting strong leadership in world affairs. European support for playing an active role in the world is stronger than American support for the United States playing such a role.
- An overwhelming majority of Americans also support the EU playing a strong leadership role and a majority believes the influence of the EU will grow

in the future. Americans also seem ready to show some deference toward the EU and give it a more significant role in important negotiations.

- Most Europeans would like the EU to become a superpower, but less are willing to increase defense spending in support of this goal. Of those who support becoming a superpower, most indicate that they do not want to be a superpower that competes with the United States.
- A modest majority of Europeans back the idea of a division of labor wherein the United States would emphasize a military role and the EU one that focuses on development assistance and reconstruction. A modest majority of Americans reject this idea.

GEOPOLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION

On geopolitical issues and globalization, Americans and Europeans agree on some matters, while diverging significantly on others. There is more convergence on Iraq than is often assumed, with both Americans and Europeans ready to consider an attack on Iraq with conditions. Americans have greater affinity for Israel than Europeans do, but want the United States to be even-handed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both sides have grown quite sanguine about Russia, but Americans show much more concern about the rise of China than do Europeans. On globalization, Americans as well as Europeans show limited enthusiasm, while feelings about trade practices and the use of biotechnology are mixed.

- Both publics have very unfavorable feelings towards Iraq and exhibit concern about its weapons program. Europeans show a readiness to consider an attack against Iraq, but insist that it must be a joint operation with UN approval. Most Americans agree. Neither Americans nor Europeans show enthusiasm for the Bush administration's policies toward Iraq.
- Americans feel moderately warm toward Israel, while Europeans feel somewhat cooler. Americans

appear to be more concerned about a military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors than Europeans. Europeans are more definitively in support of a Palestinian state. However, a very large majority of Americans want the United States to take an even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both want the other side to be more involved in the Middle East peace process.

- Neither Americans nor Europeans seem threatened by Russia, and both view its power and influence as significantly diminished. Both publics strongly favor the expansion of NATO to include Russia.
- Americans show significant concern about the rise

of China, while Europeans look upon it far more benignly.

- A bare majority of Americans see globalization as economically beneficial, while Europeans are divided or lean to the negative. Americans believe Europeans practice free trade, but Europeans are divided about U.S. trade practices. Americans are divided about the use of biotechnology in agriculture production, while a majority of Europeans oppose it. Americans agree that Europe and Japan should be allowed to label genetically modified foods—something the U.S. government has strongly opposed.



C H A P T E R O N E

Shared Problems, Shared Perceptions

Contrary to talk about a growing transatlantic rift, Americans and Europeans show evidence of warm feelings toward each other and agree on many fundamental issues. Europeans generally like Americans as much as they like each other, and Americans reciprocate. They have common views of threats and of the distribution of power in the world. Both sides strongly support a multilateral approach to international problems and the strengthening of multilateral institutions. Majorities on both sides show a strong readiness to use military force for a broad range of purposes, though European majorities are a bit larger for humanitarian and international purposes, while American majorities are a bit larger for combating terrorism. Support for NATO and its expansion is strong on both sides of the Atlantic.

PERSISTING FRIENDLINESS TOWARD EACH OTHER

Despite reports of rising anti-Americanism in Europe, Europeans¹ appear to like Americans as much as they like each other (see Figure 1-1). When asked to rate

¹Throughout this report, the figures given for Europe as a whole are weighted on the basis of adult population in each of the six countries surveyed (Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Poland).




Figure 1-1

their feelings toward various countries on a “thermometer” scale from 0 to 100—with 100 meaning very warm, 50 neutral, and 0 very cold—the British, Poles, Italians, and Germans show warmer feelings toward the United States than toward any of the European countries asked about, giving the United States ratings of 68, 65, 68, and 63 degrees, respectively. Even the French, despite their perceived traditional anti-Americanism, give the United States a relatively warm 60 degrees, while the Dutch give it 59 degrees, in both cases one of their warmest ratings.

Americans largely reciprocate these feelings. Especially popular among Americans is Britain, at 76 degrees. Also popular is Italy, at 65 degrees, and Germany, at 61 degrees. France gets a more moderate 55 degrees, while Poland gets a neutral 50 degrees. There are no signs of any cooling trend toward Europe—in most cases American’s feelings are a bit warmer than they were in 1998 and in no case are they cooler.

Americans show a more neutral feeling toward the EU as an institution, which they give a 53 degree rating. Not surprisingly, Europeans have much more enthusiasm for the EU, giving it a rating of 70 degrees. The Italians and the French show the warmest feelings toward the EU, giving it 84 and 75 degrees, respectively, whereas the British only give the EU 59 degrees.

COMMON PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS

For nearly half a century, Americans and Europeans were bound by the overriding threat of an opposing power bloc led by the Soviet Union. As the Cold War fades further into history, the question of what will continue to tie the transatlantic partners together has become more critical. Though the world has changed dramatically over the past decade, the survey finds that the European and American publics continue to be unified in a new century by common perceptions of threats.

When asked to evaluate many possible threats to their country’s vital interest over the next 10 years (see Figure 1-2), more Europeans and Americans see inter-




Figure 1-2

national terrorism as an extremely important threat than any other item about which they were questioned. Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction is close behind for both European and Americans, and Islamic fundamentalism is also of strong concern to both. (Europeans were asked to rate the threats as “extremely important,” “important,” or “not important,” while Americans rated them as “critical,” “important but not critical,” or “not important at all.”)

While the same threats elicit the highest levels of concern among both publics, far larger percentages of Americans than Europeans consider them critical (extremely important). Sixty-four percent of Europeans consider international terrorism an extremely important

threat; 91% of Americans say so (critical). The British are a little more concerned about this issue than Europeans overall (74% extremely important).

Fifty-seven percent of Europeans say Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction is an extremely important threat, while 86% of Americans show critical concern about it. In the individual countries of continental Europe that were part of the survey, responses on this item range from 43% (France) to 60% (Germany). The British, again, are more concerned than other Europeans about Iraq, with 75% considering the threat extremely important. Islamic fundamentalism is an extremely important threat to 47% of Europeans and 61% of Americans.

Other types of threats are also of concern to both Europeans and Americans. Forty-nine percent of Europeans—and 64% of the Italians—consider global warming to be an extremely important threat. Forty-six percent of Americans feel the same way.

Globalization and economic competition from across the Atlantic rank relatively low on the list of international threats. Only 20% of respondents in Europe see globalization—the rallying cry that brought so many European protesters to the streets in recent years—as an extremely important threat. Similarly, only 29% of Americans consider it a critical threat.

Interestingly, the threat of immigration registers far higher among Americans (60%) than Europeans (37%),

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despite the attention several right-wing candidates in Europe have given to the issue in recent months.

One striking difference in perceptions between the American and European publics is on China. Americans (56%) are far more likely to view China's rising power as a critical threat than Europeans (18% extremely important).




Figure 1-3

PERCEPTIONS OF POWER AND INFLUENCE

Europeans and Americans tend to agree upon the relative distribution of power in the world. When asked to rank various countries on a scale of 0 to 10 in terms of influence, with 10 meaning extremely influential, both give the United States an average rating of 9. The EU receives close to 7 from both (6.7 from Americans and 7.1 from Europeans), and the various European countries receive between 5 and 7 from both. The greatest gap in perceptions is again on China, which Americans perceive as much more influential than Europeans do (6.8 vs. 5.8).

Europeans and Americans also agree on the relative importance of economic versus military strength (see Figure 1-3). Despite America's reputation for relying heavily on military power, a substantial majority of Americans (66%), like their European counterparts (84%), believe economic strength is more important than military might in determining a country's overall power and influence in the world. Responses within the various European countries are strikingly consistent,

from 80% of respondents in Germany to 89% in the Netherlands and France. The U.S. figure is up three percentage points from 1998, contradicting the view that Americans place added value on military strength relative to economic strength after the attacks of September 11.

SHARED SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERALISM

While some pundits have portrayed the Europeans as insistent on multilateral approaches and the United States as being highly unilateralist, the CCFR/GMF survey shows that both the American and European publics are highly supportive of multilateral approaches to dealing with world problems, including participation in international institutions and treaties

Support is especially strong for working through the United Nations (see Figure 1-4). Among Americans, 77% think the UN needs to be strengthened, and 57% say that doing so should be a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy. Overall, 75% of Europeans think the UN needs to be strengthened, with the Italians (82%) and the British (81%) feeling even more strongly about it. The French are slightly less enthusiastic (67%). In a further show of support for the UN, majorities of




Figure 1-4

Americans and Europeans agree that the United States should only invade Iraq with UN approval and the support of allies (see Chapter 3).

Americans are also on a par with Europeans in their support for other international institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and NATO. Sixty-three percent of Americans and 59% of Europeans favor strengthening the WTO. Sixty-one percent of Americans and 63% of Europeans favor strengthening NATO.

Some international institutions are less popular with Americans than Europeans, in particular the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Fifty-three percent of Europeans (ranging from 47% of Germans to 62% of Italians) favor strengthening the World Bank, while only a plurality of 49% of Americans favor doing so (39% opposed). The difference with regard to the International Monetary Fund is even greater, with 53% of Europeans (ranging from 41% of Germans to 70% of Italians) in favor of strengthening it, compared to 42% of Americans (38% opposed).

There is strong support among the American public for participating in international treaties, a number of which are backed by European governments but have not been signed or ratified by the United States and which are a source of tension across the Atlantic. While Europeans were not polled on these questions, a strong majority of Americans favor participating in the Kyoto Protocol on global warming (64%), the land mines treaty (75%), and the agreement to establish an International Criminal Court (71%). The treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons test explosions worldwide garners support for U.S. participation from a resounding 81% of the U.S. public.

SHARED READINESS TO USE MILITARY FORCE

When it comes to the use of military force, commentators on both sides berate the other for being unwilling to use force. Americans deride Europeans for spending too little on defense and putting too much faith in economic and diplomatic tools when addressing interna-

tional conflicts. Americans are frequently accused by Europeans of being unwilling to risk casualties, thus being too slow to intervene, for example, in the Balkans, and relying too heavily on “surgical” air strikes.

The survey finds that, in fact, majorities on both sides of the Atlantic are ready to use military troops for a broad range of purposes. The difference comes only in emphasis: Larger majorities in Europe are willing to use force for humanitarian and international purposes, whereas the majorities in the United States are larger for force to combat terrorism.

Overall, Americans and Europeans strongly support the use of troops in four of six situations asked about: to destroy a terrorist camp, to liberate hostages, to assist a population struck by famine, and to uphold international law (see Figure 1-5). The European majorities are larger for more humanitarian missions, with 88% of Europeans supporting the use of troops to help a population struck by famine (vs. 81% of Americans) and 80% supporting troops to uphold international law (vs. 76% of Americans). But more Americans approve of the use of force to destroy a terrorist camp (92% vs. 75% of

Europeans), a difference consistent with the much stronger concern among Americans about the threat posed by international terrorism. Similar majorities in the United States and Europe support the use of force to liberate hostages (77% vs. 78%).

The most striking contrast is on the question of using force to help bring peace to a region where there is civil war. Seventy-two percent of Europeans would approve of using force in this situation, while only 48%

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(a plurality) of Americans would do so (43% disapprove). Americans, on the other hand, show more readiness to use force to ensure the supply of oil. Sixty-five percent of Americans support the use of force for this purpose, while just a plurality of 49% of Europeans feel that way.

Of the six European countries surveyed, the Germans are the least willing to engage militarily. Although in five of the six cases majorities of Germans are in favor of using troops, the percentages are generally at least 10 percentage points lower than other European countries, sometimes more. In addition, only 40% of Germans are ready to use force to ensure the supply of oil, the lowest level among Europeans in this or any other case for using troops.

SHARED RESOLVE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

On the specific issue of terrorism, large majorities of Americans and Europeans support a variety of means to address this threat, though stronger majorities of Americans advocate the use of military measures (see Figure 1-6). Eighty-seven percent of Americans favor the use of air strikes against terrorist training camps and 84% support the use of ground troops against such




Figure 1-5




Figure 1-6

camps. Europeans are also prepared to use air strikes and ground troops, albeit to a lesser degree (68% and 69%, respectively). While 66% of Americans support assassinations of terrorist leaders, a more modest 51% of Europeans favor this measure. As discussed above, on the general question about using military troops, 92% of Americans approve of doing so to destroy a terrorist camp, while 75% of Europeans favor doing so.

Among Europeans, there are also some differences. A much lower majority of 58% of Germans would approve of attacks by ground troops against terrorist training camps to fight terrorism. The Italians, like their German counterparts, are also less eager to rely on “boots on the ground” to combat terrorism, with 61% supporting attacks by ground troops. The number ranges from 75% to 80% in Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Poland. On support for assassinating terrorist leaders there is wide divergence among Europeans. Germans show the lowest support (40%), followed by the Italians (48%). Fifty percent of the French support assassination, while 56% of the British, 62% of the Dutch, and 72% of Poles do. Sixty-six percent of Americans support it.

Although Europeans are ready to commit troops in a wide variety of circumstances, larger majorities support “softer” tools when it comes to combating terrorism. As Figure 1-6 shows, 91% of Europeans favor helping poor countries develop their economies to fight terrorism, versus 78% of Americans. As found on the previous questions concerning the general use of force, Germany shows the least willingness among Europeans for measures to combat international terrorism. That holds true even for helping poor countries develop their economies, with 84% of German respondents in favor, versus 91% to 97% among the other Europeans.

Interestingly, Europeans show less support than Americans for restricting immigration as a way of dealing with terrorism. While 77% of Americans favor restricting immigration, 63% of Europeans favor doing so. Also, among Germans, despite having the largest concentration of Turkish immigrants in Europe and a series of emotional debates in their country concerning

Although Europeans are ready to commit troops in a wide variety of circumstances, larger majorities support “softer” tools when it comes to combating terrorism.

the pros and cons of tighter immigration laws, a plurality of 48% opposes the restriction of immigration into their country to combat terrorism.

SHARED SUPPORT FOR NATO AND ITS EXPANSION

Consistent with their support for multilateralism and for the use of military force, a majority of Europeans and Americans continue to view NATO as an important collective security instrument. Respondents on both sides of the Atlantic regard the defensive alliance as “still essential,” with 69% of Europeans and 56% of Americans saying so. Among Europeans, NATO is con-

sidered essential to the British (76%) more so than the French (61%).

On the question of whether the U.S. commitment to NATO should be increased, kept the same, decreased, or withdrawn completely—which has been asked of Americans in all Chicago Council surveys since they began in 1974—there is an increase in support for NATO among Americans. Those who would keep the commitment the same is up from 59% in 1998 to 65% today, while the percentage who would increase the commitment goes from 9% to 11% and the percentage who would decrease it goes from 16% to 11% (withdraw entirely goes from 5% to 6%).

On a different question, there is a further indication that support for NATO is increasing. Sixty-three percent of Europeans and 61% of Americans say they think NATO needs to be strengthened.

A second round of NATO enlargement enjoys strong popular backing, with a majority of Europeans and Americans supporting the admission of all candidate countries (see Figure 1-7). Strikingly, a majority of Americans (68%) and Europeans (60%) support the admission of Russia (not a candidate country) into




Figure 1-7

NATO. In the United States, Russia receives higher levels of support than the other seven countries asked about, while in Europe support for Russia's admission is second to that of the Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.



C H A P T E R T W O

The U.S. and EU Roles in the World

Solid majorities of Americans and Europeans want both sides to play a strong leadership role in the world. Europeans have some reservations about how the United States exercises its power, but Americans also feel that their country tends to be too domineering. Both sides have reservations about the Bush administration's foreign policy, though Americans are more positive. Europeans want to be a superpower, but seek to cooperate rather than compete with the United States and prefer to put more emphasis on the nonmilitary dimensions of power. Americans want Europeans to share the military burden of maintaining order in the world, but show hesitancy about Europe becoming strong.

MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT U.S. LEADERSHIP

Attitudes toward America's role in the world are complex. Majorities on both sides of the Atlantic support a strong international role for the United States, but there are also clear reservations about American power. Asked how desirable it is for the United States to exert strong leadership in world affairs (see Figure 2-1), 64% of Europeans say it is desirable (17% "very," 47% "some-what"). While this is still a strong majority, it is less




Figure 2-1

than the 83% of Europeans who endorse a strong leadership role for the EU. Moreover, the French are evenly divided on the question, with 48% indicating that the United States exerting strong leadership in world affairs is desirable, and an equal number indicating that it is undesirable (all other European countries indicate 63% desirability or higher).

While Americans strongly endorse U.S. leadership, they, too, seem to have reservations about a dominant role for the United States. An overwhelming 83% say that U.S. leadership is desirable (41% "very," 42% "somewhat"). At the same time, 62% disagree that the

BUSH ADMINISTRATION HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Percentage who rate the Bush administration's handling of the following as "excellent," "good," "fair," or "poor."




Figure 2-2

United States has the responsibility to play the role of world policeman, and 65% think the United States is playing that role more than it should. The very strong support among Americans for a larger role for the European Union (see next section) appears to be derived from a desire to share the burden of maintaining order in the world.

Americans and Europeans also share some doubts about the Bush administration's handling of certain foreign policy issues (see Figure 2-2). Majorities of Americans and Europeans give the Bush administration only "fair" or "poor" ratings for its handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Americans 61%, Europeans 74%), the situation in Iraq (Americans 62%, Europeans 71%), and global warming (Americans 65%, Europeans 77%).

Americans give the Bush administration higher marks in several other areas, but there are no European majorities that rate the administration's handling of any

issue asked about as "excellent" or "good." This includes the war in Afghanistan (Americans 55%, Europeans 35%), international terrorism (Americans 55%, Europeans 47%), and overall foreign policy (Americans 53%, Europeans 38%). Interestingly, the area in which Europeans give the Bush administration the highest rating is on relations with Europe, with 48% rating it "excellent" or "good" (49% "fair" or "poor"). Relations with Europe also comes out the highest among Americans, with 60% rating it "excellent" or "good."

Another indication of European reservations about certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy is their evaluation of the events of September 11 and its aftermath. A modest majority (55%) of Europeans agree with the statement, "American foreign policy contributed to the September 11 attacks." However, 59% reject the argument that the United States is using these attacks as an excuse to enforce its will around the world, in favor of

the argument that it is genuinely seeking to protect itself from further attacks.

SHARED SUPPORT FOR THE EU PLAYING A LARGER ROLE

Europeans show a readiness for the EU to play a more prominent international role. Asked how desirable it is for the EU to exert strong leadership in world affairs (see Figure 2-3), 81% of Europeans indicate it is desirable (34% “very,” 47% “somewhat”). The only European country showing somewhat less enthusiasm is Poland (not yet an EU member), with 68% saying that it is desirable (16% “very,” 52% somewhat).

Europeans show even more support for their countries taking an active part in world affairs than Americans do for the United States. Seventy-eight percent of Europeans favor taking an active part in world affairs, as opposed to staying out, compared to 71% of Americans (see Figure 2-4). The only European country with a lower percentage than the United States favoring an active part is Germany, at 65%. The countries with the most enthusiasm for an active part in world affairs are Italy (90%) and France (86%).

More striking is the level of enthusiasm displayed by Americans for a stronger role for the EU. An overwhelming 79% of Americans say that it is desirable (31% “very,” 48% “somewhat”) for the EU to exert strong leadership in world affairs—hardly different from the European average and more positive than the Germans or Poles.




Figure 2-3




Figure 2-4

Americans already perceive the EU’s influence as quite strong, and half perceive its influence as rising. Asked to rate how much influence the EU has in the world on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 meaning extremely influential, the average response is 6.7. Of the individual European countries included, only Great Britain is seen as more influential at 7.0. Other European countries are rated lower—Germany at 6.1 and France at 5.4. Of all the rest of the countries in the world, only China is rated as currently having more influence in the world than the EU (6.8). Asked whether the EU plays a more important and powerful role, a less important role, or about as important a role as a world leader today compared to 10 years ago, 50% of Americans say the EU’s role is more important, with just 16% saying it is less important, and 28% saying as important.

More significantly, a clear majority of Americans predict that the EU’s influence will rise over the next decade. Asked whether in their estimation the following countries will play a greater role or a lesser role in the next 10 years than they do today, 60% say the EU will be more influential. Once again, Great Britain is the only European country in the same league, with 60% predicting that it will play a greater role. In sharp con-

trast, a majority of 54% and a plurality of 47% see France and Germany, respectively, playing lesser roles in the future. Among the countries of the rest of the world, only the United States and China receive larger majorities than the EU (86% and 72%, respectively) predicting that their influence will increase.

Despite the strong ratings among Americans for China in terms of perceived current and future influence in the world, Americans believe that Europe is more important to the United States than Asia, and that view is on the rise. Fifty-eight percent of Americans say Europe is more important, up from 42% in 1998. This

Despite the strong ratings among Americans for China in terms of perceived current and future influence in the world, Americans believe Europe is more important to the United States than Asia.

compares with 27% who say Asia is more important than Europe (28% in 1998).

Americans also seem ready to show some deference toward the EU and give it a more significant role in important negotiations. Seventy percent of Americans agree with the statement that, “When dealing with common problems, the U.S. and the European Union should be more willing to make decisions jointly, even if this means that the U.S. as well as Europe will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice” (27% disagree).

In at least one area, Americans appear even more ready than Europeans to have the EU play a stronger role. Consistent with their support for the EU taking a strong leadership role in the world, an overwhelming 83% of Americans say that in the Middle East conflict they would like to see the European Union be more involved in the negotiations, while also bearing more of the political and economic costs. A smaller majority of Europeans (65%) endorse this role for the EU, with support ranging from a low of 56% (Poles) to a high of

73% (Italians). A statistically equivalent number of Europeans (64%) want the United States to play a stronger role as well, with support ranging from a low of 56% (French and Dutch) to a high of 69% (Italians).

SHOULD THE EU BECOME A SUPERPOWER?

As the EU has gained a more prominent profile on the world stage and its GDP has achieved parity with that of the United States, an increasingly prominent question is whether the EU will become a superpower, and if so, will its role mirror that of the United States, or will it be some other kind of superpower. In this area, the poll found significant differences between the majority opinions of Americans and Europeans as well as among Europeans. However, on a number of key questions the majorities were fairly modest, suggesting that there is not a clear consensus on these issues.

Europeans indicate clearly that they would like the EU to become a superpower. Presented two options (see Figure 2-5), 65% of Europeans say the EU should become a superpower like the United States, while only 14% endorse the view that the United States should be the only superpower. Only in the case of Germany does a plurality (48%) rather than a majority endorse the idea of the EU becoming a superpower. In all other cases this idea is supported by a clear majority, ranging from 56% of the British to an overwhelming 91% of the French. In two countries—Germany and the




Figure 2-5

Netherlands—a quarter of respondents volunteered the response, “No country should be a superpower.”

Despite their desire to become a superpower, Europeans indicate that they do not want to be a superpower that mirrors or competes with the United States. In response to a followup question of those who favor the EU becoming a superpower, just 11% say they want to do so to better compete with the United States, while an overwhelming 84% say they want to do so in order to cooperate more effectively with the United States in dealing with international problems.

There is somewhat less enthusiasm for the EU becoming a superpower if it means spending more on defense. Those who said they favored the EU being a superpower were subsequently asked, “Would you be willing for Europe to be a superpower even if this meant greater military expenditures?” Of this group, 52% say they would (only among the Dutch do a majority demur). However, this means that only 34% of the total

There is somewhat less enthusiasm for the EU becoming a superpower if it means spending more on defense.

sample would support the EU becoming a superpower if it involves increases in defense spending.

This finding is consistent with the lack of support among Europeans for increasing defense spending in general. Forty-two percent favor keeping defense spending about the same, while 33% want to cut it back, and only 22% want to expand it. There is much divergence on this question among Europeans in various countries. More people in Italy (52%) and Germany (45%) want to cut back defense than want to keep it the same or increase it. More people in Poland want to increase defense spending (45%) than want to keep it the same or cut it back. The rest prefer keeping it the same (Great Britain and the Netherlands 53%, France 47%).

More Europeans also think U.S. defense spending should be kept about the same (38%) than think it

ROLE SPECIALIZATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

Percentage who agree or disagree with the following statement: “It makes sense for Europe and the U.S. to specialize in their roles in the world. Because the U.S. has the strongest military, the U.S. should take the lead responsibility and supply most of the forces when it comes to military conflict. Europe should instead emphasize things like assisting poor countries develop their economies and trying to help reconstruct societies after a war.”




Figure 2-6

should be either cut back (35%) or expanded (19%). In other words, more Europeans would keep the current levels of defense spending about the same on both sides of the Atlantic than would increase or decrease them, though there are more who would cut back spending on both sides than would expand it.

In keeping with the lack of support for increased spending on defense, a modest majority (52%) of Europeans back the idea of a division of labor between the United States and the European Union in which the United States takes the lead responsibility and supplies most of the forces when it comes to military conflict, while Europe instead emphasizes things like assisting poor countries develop their economies and trying to help reconstruct societies after a war (see Figure 2-6). In policy circles, the idea that the United States and Europe should play complementary roles in the world in accordance with their relative strengths has been hotly debated—by detractors as well as proponents. The CCFR/GMF survey finds that there is support among the European public for such a division of labor, with

slight majorities in every European country surveyed except France agreeing with the idea. A majority of the French (55%) disagree with the idea, with 43% agreeing.

FREE RIDERS IN EUROPE?

Given that most Europeans do not favor increasing their defense spending, yet also do not favor a decrease in U.S. defense spending, are they trying to get a free ride from the United States or play the role of superpower on the cheap?

From a European perspective this does not necessarily signify a desire for a free ride. European reluctance to increase defense spending may well reflect a lower level of perceived threat, or at least a greater tolerance of threats. Indeed, when presented a list of possible threats, Europeans are less inclined to rate them as critical than are Americans. In addition, two-thirds of those Europeans who support reductions in their own country's defense spending (a significant 33%) also tend to favor such reductions in U.S. spending, and only one in 10 favor an increase in U.S. defense expenditures.

Nonetheless, Europeans overall find it unobjectionable for the United States to spend more on defense, just as they find it unobjectionable for Europe to focus on helping poor countries develop their economies, while the United States supplies most of the forces in a conflict. The higher priority in their minds seems to be for the EU to pursue nonmilitary approaches to dealing with international problems, which they appear to view as more important and possibly more effective. This is consistent with the idea of the EU being a different kind of superpower, playing a complementary rather than competitive role relative to the United States and placing emphasis in different areas.

From the American perspective, Europeans should be expected to play a greater military role. A majority of 56% oppose the idea of the United States being the military “cook” and Europe doing the “dishwashing” of humanitarian assistance and postwar reconstruction (39% support the idea). Apparently, Americans do not like the idea that the United States is going to play the

role of the “heavy.” As mentioned, Americans already feel that the United States plays the role of world policeman more than it should. Also, in numerous questions throughout this poll, Americans show a very strong preference when using military force to do so with the support of allies as part of a multilateral operation.

While wanting the EU to play a military role and, as discussed earlier, wanting the EU to play a strong leadership role in world affairs, Americans appear to have reservations about the EU becoming too strong. When given two choices about their views of the United States and Europe as superpowers, only 33% of

European reluctance to increase their defense spending may well reflect a lower level of perceived threat, or at least a greater tolerance for threats.

Americans say the European Union should become a superpower like the United States, rather than saying the United States should remain the only superpower (52%). Presented a list of international institutions, only 45% of Americans say the EU needs to be strengthened—a fairly low number relative to the other institutions listed. Also, when asked how they feel about the level of EU defense spending, just 38% think that European governments should expand defense spending, while 39% think they should keep it the same and 14% think they should cut it.



CHAPTER THREE

Geopolitics and Globalization

On geopolitical issues and globalization, Americans and Europeans agree on some issues, while diverging significantly on others. With regard to Iraq, there is more convergence than is often assumed, with Europeans showing readiness to consider participating in an attack on Iraq and Americans insisting that any action should be multilateral. Americans have greater affinity for Israel than Europeans do, but even Americans want the United States to be even-handed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both sides have grown quite sanguine about Russia, but Americans show much more concern about the rise of China than do Europeans. On globalization, Americans and Europeans share a limited enthusiasm for it, with the Americans somewhat more positive than Europeans. Americans feel that Europe is a fair trader, but Europeans are not as positive about the United States. Both sides show concern about biotechnology, and Americans agree with Europeans that they should be able to label genetically modified food.

COMMON GROUND ON IRAQ

At the time of this survey, Iraq was one of the most contentious issues on the global agenda. Despite the acrimony between American and European leaders over

Iraq, the survey finds remarkable similarities in how their respective publics view the issue.

First, both publics have very unfavorable feelings toward Iraq. When asked to rate their feelings toward Iraq on a thermometer scale from 0 to 100, with 50 meaning “neutral,” both Americans and Europeans give Iraq very low scores (23 and 25 degrees, respectively), reflecting their very low affinity for that country. No other country receives scores as low from respondents on either side of the Atlantic. Even the French, who have traditionally had close political and economic ties with Iraq, give it a mean score of only 33 degrees.

Second, both American and European publics exhibit concern about Iraq as a potential military threat, though Americans are more worried about the threat than Europeans. As discussed in Chapter 1, 86% of Americans and 57% of Europeans regard Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction as a “critical” (“extremely important” in Europe) threat. Only international terrorism is viewed by larger majorities on both sides of the Atlantic (91% of Americans and 64% of Europeans) as a critical (extremely important) threat.

Third, and perhaps most surprising, Europeans show a readiness to consider an attack against Iraq—provided there is UN approval and the support of




Figure 3-1

allies—while the expected American support is contingent upon these same conditions. Given three choices about their views on invading Iraq (see Figure 3-1), only 26% of Europeans and 13% of Americans say the United States should not invade Iraq, and only 20% of Americans and 10% of Europeans say the United States should invade Iraq even if they have to go it alone. More Europeans and Americans by far (60% and 65%, respectively) say the United States should only invade Iraq with UN approval and the support of its allies.

What is most striking about these findings is that only 26% of Europeans rule out completely a strike against Iraq, and only 20% of Americans feel so strongly about an attack on Iraq that they would be willing for the United States to do so alone. In another series of questions, there is further evidence of European willingness to take part in a military action against Iraq if the operation has UN approval. Each European respondent was presented with one of eight scenarios in which their countries might participate in an attack. To create these scenarios, each of three variables was rotated at random—the reason for attacking, the presence or absence

of UN approval, and the expected number of Western casualties. The question as a whole reads as follows:

“Imagine now that Iraq is found to [be acquiring weapons of mass destruction/have helped the terrorist group of Osama bin Laden]. The U.S. is considering attacking Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein [with/without] the approval of the United Nations. The war is expected to entail [many/few] Western casualties. Should (country) government take part in this military action or should we stay out of it?”

In all scenarios in which there was UN approval, a modest majority of Europeans, ranging from 51% to 56%, say they would support taking part, and in no scenario without UN approval do respondents in any country favor taking part. Only the Germans consistently oppose participation. Polish and Italian support varies significantly depending upon the variables presented, while the British, French, and Dutch consistently support taking action provided there is UN approval.

Surprisingly, the presence or absence of significant casualties has little effect on respondents’ willingness to have their country take part. The two stated reasons for

Only 26% of Europeans rule out completely a strike against Iraq, and only 20% of Americans feel so strongly about an attack on Iraq that they would be willing for the United States to do so alone.

attacking—either because Iraq is acquiring weapons of mass destruction or helping the terrorist group of Osama bin Laden—elicit very similar levels of support.

In any case, as mentioned earlier, neither Americans nor Europeans show enthusiasm for the Bush administration’s policies toward Iraq. Only 32% of Americans and 21% of Europeans rate the administration’s handling of the situation in Iraq as either “excel-

lent” or “good,” while 62% of Americans and 71% of Europeans rate it as “fair” or “poor.” Among Europeans, the French, Germans, and British are most critical.

DIFFERENCES OVER THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The survey confirms that, at least at the public level, Americans and Europeans tend to look at the Arab-Israeli conflict through somewhat different lenses. Ultimately, though, Americans favor an even-handed policy in the conflict, and both sides want the other more involved in trying to resolve the conflict.

When asked to rate their feelings toward countries on the thermometer scale, Americans show far warmer feelings toward Israel than Europeans do, with Americans giving Israel a mean score of 55 degrees, compared with the European rating of 38 degrees. In fact, Americans give Israel the same score as Russia and France, whereas Europeans give Israel a score that is 9 degrees lower than Russia and nearly 25 degrees lower than any other Western country. Among Europeans, the Germans (32 degrees) and Poles (29 degrees) have the coolest feelings toward Israel.




Figure 3-2

Americans are also more concerned about military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors than Europeans. When asked to evaluate different threats to the vital interests of their country over the next 10 years, 67% of Americans identify the Arab/Israeli conflict as a “critical” threat, while only 42% of Europeans identify it as such (“extremely important”).

Americans and Europeans also differ in their responses to questions about an independent Palestinian state (see Figure 3-2). Seventy-two percent of European respondents say they favor “the establishment of an independent state on the West Bank and the Gaza strip.” In response to the same question, only 40% of Americans respondents say they favor such a state, but when asked whether they think that President Bush’s endorsement of an independent Palestinian state was a good idea or a bad idea, 58% of Americans say they think it was a good idea.

Perhaps most significantly, despite their relatively warm feelings toward Israel and cool feelings toward the Palestinians (35 degrees), Americans want the United States to take an even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A very strong 71% of respondents say the United States should not take either side in the conflict.

Despite the notable differences in opinion between the United States and Europe on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 83% of Americans and 64% of Europeans want the other to be more involved in Middle East negotiations, while also bearing more of the political and economic costs.

SANGUINE ABOUT RUSSIA

Americans and Europeans have dramatically altered their views of Russia since the Cold War and appear ready to welcome this former adversary as an ally.

Neither appear particularly threatened by or concerned about Russia. When asked to evaluate different threats to the vital interests of their countries over the next 10 years, only 27% of Americans and 14% of Europeans identify “political turmoil in Russia” as a “critical” (“extremely important” in Europe) threat.

Both view Russia's power and influence to be significantly diminished. When asked how much influence Russia has in the world on a scale of 0 to 10, Americans give Russia a 6.5, while Europeans give it a 6. By com-

Americans tend to view China as a rising competitor for power and a potential destabilizing force in the international system, while Europeans look upon China far more benignly.

parison, the United States is viewed by both as a 9, and the EU as a 6.7 by Americans and a 7.1 by Europeans.

Most significantly, both publics want Russia to be a part of NATO, with a substantial majority of Americans (68%) and Europeans (60%) saying they favor the expansion of NATO to include Russia. Russia receives higher support than any of the current candidate countries among Americans and is second to the Baltic states among Europeans (61%).

This does not mean either side feels extremely warmly toward Russia. On the feelings thermometer, Americans give Russia a mean score of 55 degrees, while Europeans give it a mean score of 47 degrees.

GREATER AMERICAN CONCERN ABOUT CHINA'S RISE

Americans and Europeans diverge more significantly on China. Americans tend to view China as a rising competitor for power and a potential destabilizing force in the international system, while Europeans look upon China far more benignly.

A majority of Americans (56%) regard the development of China as a world power as a "critical" threat, compared with only 18% of Europeans who have this view. This is the sharpest divergence between Americans and Europeans in terms of perceptions of threats.

Americans also perceive China to be more influential than Europeans do. When asked to rate the influ-

ence China has in the world on a scale of 0 to 10, Americans give China a mean score of 6.8—about what they give the European Union—while Europeans give it a 5.8—the same score they accord France. Again, this is the sharpest divergence between Americans and Europeans on perceptions of influence in the world.

The results of this survey—which show a Europe concerned about global threats like international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism and willing to be engaged in places like the Middle East—suggest that European focus extends beyond their region, but may not yet reach to China.

LIMITED ENTHUSIASM FOR GLOBALIZATION

One of the most commonly perceived areas of disagreement between Europeans and Americans is on the issue of globalization. The United States is seen as the inventor and foremost patron of globalization, while the Europeans are seen as its most vocal critics. It was the French farmer Jose Bove who launched the antiglobalization campaign against McDonald's, while the "slow foods" movement got its start in Italy. Furthermore, Europeans have constituted the lion's share of the antiglobalization protesters disrupting G-8, World Bank, and other international gatherings.

Nonetheless, the survey shows that Americans and Europeans share a limited enthusiasm for globalization, with Americans somewhat more positive than the Europeans. On a question about globalization's impact in several areas (see Figure 3-3), 52% of Americans and 45% of Europeans believe globalization is good for their own country's economy, while 51% of Americans and 42% of Europeans believe it is good for their own standard of living.

In terms of its international effects, 64% of Americans and 48% of Europeans perceive globalization to be good for providing jobs and strengthening the economy in poor countries, while 53% of Americans and 46% of Europeans see it as helping maintain cultural diversity in the world. (The don't knows and neutral responses to all of these questions are quite high.)

IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION				
<i>Percentage who think globalization is good or bad for the following:</i>				
	EUROPE		U.S.	
	GOOD	BAD	GOOD	BAD
Providing jobs and strengthening the economy in poor countries	48	34	64	21
Maintaining cultural diversity in the world	46	37	53	28
Your country's economy	45	35	52	30
Your own standard of living	42	30	51	28

Figure 3-3

When Americans were asked overall, “Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States?” 56% respond in the affirmative, 27% respond in the negative, and 8% volunteer that it is equally good and bad (this question was not asked in Europe). Strikingly, when Americans are asked to choose among four U.S. policy goals regarding further globalization, only 14% say the United States should actively promote it, and 35% think the United States should allow it to continue; but 24% would like to try to slow it down and 15% want to try to reverse it.

MIXED VIEWS ON TRADE

Central to globalization is the growth of trade, including a tremendous amount of trade between the United States and the EU. Americans, for the most part, believe Europeans practice free trade, but Europeans are more divided in their evaluations of the trade practices of the United States. When asked whether they think certain countries practice fair or unfair trade with the United States (see Figure 3-4), 60% of American respondents indicate that they believe the countries of the European Union practice fair trade, as opposed to 20% who think they practice unfair trade.

On the other hand, 44% of European respondents think the United States practices unfair trade, as compared to 43% who believe it practices fair trade. The French are the most critical, with a striking 74% indicating that the United States practices unfair trade, versus 20% fair trade. For all other European countries, a plurality (a majority in the case of Germany) say that the United States practices fair trade. Notably, European respondents give more positive evaluations of Japanese trade practices (48% fair trade versus 31% unfair trade) than they do of American.

In their trade relations, a prominent point of conflict between the United States and the EU is over

Americans, for the most part, believe Europeans practice free trade, but Europeans are more divided in their evaluations of the trade practices of the United States.

biotechnology. U.S. agricultural producers have done battle for over a decade with European consumer groups over their right to export genetically modified products into the European Union. European protesters have rallied against American “Frankenfoods.” However, the survey finds that while Europeans are, not surprisingly, opposed to such innovations in food production, Americans are surprisingly ambivalent. When asked, “Overall would you say you strongly support, moderately support, moderately oppose, or strongly oppose the use of biotechnology in agriculture and food produc-




Figure 3-4




Figure 3-5

tion?” 62% of Europeans indicate moderate or strong opposition, with 33% showing moderate or strong support (see Figure 3-5). Among Europeans, the most

opposed are the Italians (65%) and the British (69%). On the American side, 45% show moderate or strong opposition, and 48% show moderate or strong support.

Americans are also quite sympathetic to the argument that European countries should be able to label genetically modified foods—something that the U.S. government has strongly opposed. Asked specifically whether the European Union and Japan should be able to require labeling of genetically modified food, even if this might keep consumers from purchasing food imported from the United States, 66% of American respondents think the EU and Japan should be able to impose such a labeling requirement, while 26% think it should not.

EUROPEAN SURVEY

The German Marshall Fund commissioned MORI (Market & Opinion Research International) to collect the data for this survey in six European countries: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland. The survey was conducted by telephone interviews in all countries via Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) except Poland, where the telephone penetration is lower, and a face-to-face Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) approach was used. In each of the six European countries, a representative sample of 1,000 adults living in private households was selected. Households were selected by a random digit dialing approach. Pre-tests were conducted in all countries between May 13-22, 2002. The fieldwork for the survey was conducted between June 5 and July 6, 2002, by the institutes in the table below.

Each partner agency used a random digit dialing approach that best suited the country's market with the aim of achieving interviews with a representative national sample. The random last/next birthday method was

used, where interviewers asked to speak with the member of the household 18 years or older who had the last/next birthday (except in Great Britain and Poland). This systematic respondent selection technique has been shown empirically to produce samples that closely mirror the population in terms of age and gender. In Great Britain and Poland, respondents were chosen randomly, but quotas were set to ensure that a representative cross section of the population was interviewed.

The completed interview lasted approximately 20 to 25 minutes. The overall average response rate was 37%. Nonresponse in telephone interview surveys produces some known biases in survey-derived estimates because participation tends to vary for different subgroups of the population and these subgroups are likely to vary also on questions of substantive interest. In order to compensate for these known biases, data for each country was weighted according to known demographic characteristics of the population (by age, sex, and education). For each individual country, there were no significant differences between the weighted and unweighted figures. The results in this report for the individual countries are therefore unweighted. The figures for Europe as a whole are weighted on the basis of adult population in each of the six countries surveyed.

All the figures given for Europe as a whole in this report include the "don't know" response alternative. In the documents released on September 4, 2002, the "don't know" response alternative for Europe as a whole were not included for 6 of the 32 questions. The inclusion of the "don't know" response alternative will slightly modify the results for the other response alternatives (often by 1 or 2%).

For results based on the total sample in each of the six countries, one can say with 95% confidence that the

Country	Agency	Fieldwork
Great Britain	MORI	5 - 30 June
Germany	IMAS International	5 - 30 June
Italy	DOXA	5 June - 2 July
France	Demoscopie	5 June - 6 July
The Netherlands	ITC International BV	5 - 29 June
Poland	Taylor Nelson Sofres	5 - 30 June

error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the margin of error is less than plus or minus 1.4 percentage points.

U.S. SURVEY

Harris Interactive conducted 2,862 telephone interviews in the United States among men and women 18 years of age and older, using a random digit dialing technique with a national probability sample. In order to ensure comparability with the in-person Chicago Council studies of 1998 and previous years, personal in-home interviews with a national probability sample of 400 men and women 18 years of age and older were also conducted, using an abridged version of the telephone questionnaire that concentrated on questions repeated from 1998. All interviewing of the general public was conducted between June 1 and June 30, 2002. Data for the telephone and in-person interviews were weighted separately according to known demographic characteristics of the population and merged to form a combined sample (n=3,262).

In order to explore a very extensive set of topics, many questions were asked only of randomly selected subsamples of approximately 700 telephone respondents. “Core” questions, including most of those repeated from 1998, were also asked of the 400 in-person interviewees. Certain key questions were asked of all 2,862 telephone interviewees or all 3,262 respondents.

The margin of sampling error in response frequencies varies negatively with the number of respondents asked a question and positively with the closeness of opinion division. For a fifty-fifty division of opinion

(where margins of error are highest), at the $p \leq .05$ level the margins of error in this study range from 1.7 percentage points (for questions asked of all respondents) up to 4 percentage points (for questions asked of 700 respondents).

Separate analysis of the telephone and in-person data reveals that, as the literature would predict, there tend to be certain systematic “mode” differences in responses. Telephone interviewees, for example, tend to give fewer “don’t know” responses and to give more “positive” or first-option responses (e.g., more perceptions of vital interests and more ratings of goals as “very important”). This does not mean that either method is incorrect; both meet professional standards and accurately reflect responses by the populations from which they sample. But mode differences do complicate the assessment of opinion changes from the in-person surveys of 1998 and previous years. This report is based on the combined 2002 telephone and in-person data set, which mitigates mode differences. In addition, only those contrasts with previous Council surveys that appear in both the 2002 combined data set and the 2002 in-person interviews taken separately are interpreted in this report as demonstrating opinion changes. An exception is made for the “active part in world affairs” question, for which the in-person responses do not show a significant change from 1998, but the much higher level of activism displayed in the 2,862 telephone responses is confirmed as indicating a real opinion change by others’ surveys conducted in 2002.

Chicago Council surveys have been carried out every four years since 1974. Prior to 2002, all but the first were conducted by the Gallup Organization; Harris conducted the 1974 survey.